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ABSTRACT 
Impact of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Rate Increase on Marketing Spending and 
Cross-State Substitution 
 
by 
 
Mikael B. Ahlgren 
 
Dr. Sarah Tanford, Examination Chair 
Assistant Professor Department of Hotel Management 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 The purpose of this research was to investigate three potential consequences 
related to the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax rate restructuring. The first section presents the 
assessment of whether a higher tax rate motivated an Illinois casino operator to reduce of 
marketing/promotional expenditures in an attempt to negatively influence revenues. The 
second establishes if the surrounding state gaming operators reacted to the increased 
Gaming Tax rate in Illinois, by raising their marketing spending. The last section clarifies 
whether the changes to the Illinois Gaming Tax Schedule impacted gaming volumes in 
the neighboring/competing states of Indiana, Iowa, and Missouri. 
 The analysis relied on data collected from three primary sources. The marketing 
spend data was provided by a major Illinois riverboat operator.  The second analysis used 
data from SEC filings to observe promotional expenditures by operator(s) competing for 
gaming business with Illinois riverboats.  The third analysis utilized data made available 
by the state Gaming Control Boards and focused on how the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax 
rate restructuring impacted gaming demand in the surrounding states. 
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 The findings reveal that the 2003 restructuring of the Gaming Tax in Illinois 
impacted each area of interest, showing that promotional spending by a major Illinois 
riverboat operator was significantly reduced, the promotional spending by a major 
operator of commercial casinos in the surrounding states showed a statistically significant 
increase in response to the increase in the Illinois Gaming Tax, and lastly, the gaming 
demand in the three geographic areas located in the three bordering states was positively 
impacted by the 2003 Gaming Tax increase in the state of Illinois. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The July 1, 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax rate increase represented the peak of a gradual 
upward trend in gaming taxation that began when riverboat gaming was legalized in 
1991.  When riverboat gambling was first legalized, commercial gaming operators had 
initially agreed to a flat tax rate of 20% of annual adjusted gross receipts (AGR) or 
gaming win.  When investigating gaming taxation policies it is noteworthy to 
differentiate commercial casinos from other forms of casinos or gaming opportunities. 
Commercial casinos are comprised of riverboat (often docked), land-based, and racetrack 
casinos which are intended to be operated for commercial means.  State regulators often 
draw distinctions between these aforementioned types of gaming operations (Anderson, 
2005). 
The commercial gaming tax rate initially began the upward trend in 1998 when 
Illinois decided to transition from the flat tax to a graduated rate that set the gaming tax 
for the lowest tier at 15% of AGR up to $25 million in gaming win which stepped up to 
35% of AGR in the highest tier.  The tax receipts were further supplemented with a $2 
dollar admission fee that was split between the state and the local government serving as 
the hosting jurisdiction.  The next major increase occurred in 2002 when the top tier was 
increased to 50% of AGR and the admissions tax increased to $3 dollars.  A detailed 
summary can be seen in Table 1. 
 
 
 
2 
 
Table 1 
1999 – 2005 Illinois Gaming Tax Rates and Admission Tax 
Year  
1999 Graduated Tax Rate from 15% to 35% of gross gaming revenue,$2 per patron 
admissions tax 
2000 Graduated Tax Rate from 15% to 35% of gross gaming revenue,$2 per patron 
admissions tax 
2001 Graduated Tax Rate from 15% to 35% of gross gaming revenue,$2 per patron 
admissions tax 
2002 Graduated Tax Rate from 15% to 50% (Maximum tax rate through June 2002 
35%) of gross gaming revenue,$3 per patron admissions tax 
2003 Graduated Tax Rate from 15% to 70% of gross gaming revenue,$3-$5 per 
patron admissions tax 
2004 Graduated Tax Rate from 15% to 70% of gross gaming revenue,$3-$5 per 
patron admissions tax 
2005 Graduated Tax Rate from 15% to 50% of gross gaming revenue,$2-$3 per 
patron admissions tax 
Note.  Gaming Taxation Rates were retrieved from Illinois Gaming Commission Annual 
Reports from 1999 to 2005.  Retrieved January 15, 2010 from 
http://www.igb.illinois.gov/annualreport/. 
The casino industry vociferously objected to the 2003 Illinois changes, in part arguing 
that the state erroneously believed that the gaming industry was immune to generally 
accepted economic laws.  The gaming industry’s stakeholders have long argued that 
lawmakers consider increasing gaming taxes a safe target in an effort to generate state 
revenues.  Gaming’s advocates point to what they believe is a general misconception that 
the industry is hyper profitable compared to other businesses and are capable of paying 
whatever is necessary to balance state budgets (Christiansen, 2005). 
 Regardless of the industry protest, the top tier of the Illinois Gaming Tax rate was 
increased to 70% on July 1, 2003.  All other gaming tax rate tiers, with exception of the 
lowest, were also increased by 5 to 7.5%.  In addition, the schedule determining the 
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applicable tax tier to be paid by a commercial riverboat casino was shifted to the state’s 
favor.  Casinos with the same adjusted gross revenue could both shift to a higher tier 
which furthermore had an upwards adjusted rate.  For example, a riverboat with adjusted 
gross revenues of just over $25 million dollars would pay a gaming tax of 27.5% of AGR 
in 2003 compared to the 22.5% of AGR that the same boat would have paid in prior to 
the increase. 
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Table 2 
Overview of 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Increase 
 2002 Illinois Gaming Tax Rate 
& Admissions Tax 
2003 (post July 1) Illinois Gaming 
Tax rate & Admissions Tax 
Gaming Tax 
Rate as 
percentage of 
Adjusted Gross 
Receipts or 
Gaming Win 
15% of AGR up to and including 
$25 million 
22.5% of AGR in excess of $25 
million but not exceeding $50 
million 
27.5% of AGR in excess of $50 
million but not exceeding $75 
million 
32.5% of AGR in excess of $75 
million but not exceeding 
$100 million 
37.5% of AGR in excess of $100 
million but not exceeding 
$150 million 
45% of the AGR in excess of 
$150 million but not 
exceeding $200 million 
50%of AGR in excess of $200 
million 
15% of AGR up to and including 
$25 million 
27.5% of AGR in excess of $25 
million but not exceeding $37.5 
million 
32.5% of AGR in excess of $37.5 
million but not exceeding $50 
million 
37.5% of AGR in excess of $50 
million but not exceeding $75 
million 
45% of AGR in excess of $75 
million but not exceeding $100 
million 
50% of the AGR in excess of $100 
million but not exceeding $250 
million 
70% of AGR in excess of $250 
million 
Admissions Tax $3 per patron admissions tax $3 per patron for licensees that 
admitted fewer than one million 
persons in the previous calendar 
year. 
 $4 per patron for licensees that 
admitted more than one million 
persons but fewer than 2.3 
million persons in the previous 
calendar year. 
$5 per patron for licensees that 
admitted more than 2.3 million 
persons in the previous calendar 
year. 
Note.  Gaming Taxation Rates were retrieved from Illinois Gaming Commission Annual 
Reports from 2003.  Retrieved January 15, 2010 from  
http://www.igb.illinois.gov/annualreport/. 
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Prior research into the increase in the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax rate revealed that the 
policy change resulted in a decrease in gaming demand in the state of Illinois (Ahlgren, 
Dalbor, & Singh, 2009).  Having recognized a negative relationship between gaming 
taxation and gaming demand as represented by coin-in, further investigation into the 
mechanisms that produced the drop off in demand is warranted, as well as an expanded 
analysis of the consequences related to the policy change. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the results and effects related to the 
2003 gaming tax increase in Illinois.  The primary focus is the attempt to understand a 
potential direct driver of the decrease in gaming demand.  Since casino patrons do not 
pay the main gaming tax directly from their wallets, changes to their behavior must be 
explained by other means.   A potential explanation for the decrease in gaming demand is 
that operators withhold or decrease their marketing/promotional expenditures when a tax 
policy creates an incentive to reduce revenues. 
An additional objective is to investigate whether the surrounding state gaming 
operators reacted to the gaming tax rate increase in Illinois by increasing their marketing 
budgets.  This could have potentially occurred if operators recognized that Illinois 
operators were scaling back on promotional and marketing budgets and thereby creating a 
climate where competitors in neighboring states could develop programs meant to 
encourage cross-state substitution. 
A third objectivee of the research is to understand whether the changes to the Illinois 
Gaming Tax schedule impacted gaming demand in the neighboring/competing states of 
Iowa, Missouri, and Indiana.  Riverboat casinos operating in competing states and in 
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close proximity to Illinois operators impacted by the gaming tax increase might benefit 
from increased economic pressure on Illinois riverboat casino operators and experience 
an increase in demand. 
Research Questions 
1. What was the mechanism that directly impacted the behavior of Illinois gamblers? 
a. Did Illinois riverboat operators change their promotional and comp 
policies and marketing related expenditures in response to gaming tax rate 
changes? 
2. Did operators in surrounding states increase their marketing/promotional budgets 
to attract Illinois customers? 
3. Did the changes in gaming tax rates impact demand in states surrounding Illinois 
and therefore potentially vying for the same customers? 
a. If there was a cross-state impact, was it more pronounced at locations that 
were closer in proximity to Illinois? 
Overview 
The Midwest commercial riverboat casino industry, since its inception in the 1990’s, 
has been characterized by state to state competition for the gaming dollar.  Riverboat 
states have legalized commercial gaming in an attempt to capture the gaming taxes 
generated by their own residents as well as attract cross-state gaming customers.  Post 
legalization, the riverboat states have adjusted regulations in an attempt to position their 
operators more favorably and thereby providing a competitive advantage which should 
logically lead to increased gaming demand and the inherent increased in gaming tax 
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revenues.  This suggests that at least at the state level, there is acknowledgement that 
gaming has the potential to attract business across state lines.   
Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is arranged in to five chapters.  The first chapter or the introduction 
has introduced the topic or research, presented the research questions, and provided an 
overview of the significance of the study.  The second chapter includes an overview of 
the subject area via a review of the related literature.  Chapter 3 serves to explain the 
research methodology and design, furthermore data sources will be identified as well as 
the proposed statistical analysis.  The fourth chapter presents the results of the statistical 
analysis.  Finally, Chapter 5 includes a discussion of the results, suggestions of 
implications, and finally gives some guidance as to potential future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
This chapter begins with an overview of the U.S. commercial casino market and in 
particular the Midwestern riverboat casinos.  Secondly, prior research involving casino 
regulation and taxation that relates to the Illinois Gaming Tax increase is presented.  The 
literature review also includes a section providing an overview of academic studies of 
executive behavior and reactions to various economic pressures.   
The U.S. commercial casino gaming industry constitutes the largest portion of the 
commercial gaming market.  A casino is typically distinguished by the offering of banked 
games.  The term “banked game” indicates that the casino is an active participant and 
thereby has a stake in who wins or loses.  Commercial casino gaming has developed into 
multiple forms among which the most common is the Las Vegas-type casino, but also 
includes excursion and permanently moored riverboats along with card rooms and 
racinos (American Gaming Association, 2010).  The term racino describes parimutual 
racetracks that are permitted to offer casino-type gaming devices (Thalheimer, 2008).  In 
some cases the casino-type device refers to video lottery terminals and in other cases the 
term refers to electronic gaming devices.    
Reasons States Adopt Commercial Gaming 
Furlong (1998) examined the question of what factors motivate states to adopt 
legalized commercial casino gaming.  Furlong determined that four themes repeatedly 
surfaced to explain why states adopted gaming:  Gaming tax revenues, political 
feasibility, intra-state competitiveness, and local and state economic development.  
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Furlong employed a cross-sectional analysis using a dichotomous variable to represent 
the legalization or non-legalization of commercial casino gaming.  The results of the 
study suggested that states were most likely to legalize commercial gaming in order to 
spur economic development and/or for reasons of political feasibility.  Political feasibility 
refers to the notion that gaming taxes may be preferable to other forms of taxation or 
reductions in government services (Furlong, 1998). 
Taxes raised from commercial gaming are often dedicated to either state or local 
governments for particular purposes.  Examples of these earmarks are:  Michigan, which 
directs 45% of casino taxation to the state school aid fund;  Illinois, who funnels a portion 
of collected gaming taxes to education and another portion to local governments serving 
as host communities; and New Jersey, who directs funds collected through gaming 
taxation to benefit the elderly and disabled.  Most recipients receiving funds from gaming 
taxation received the monies from the state’s general fund before gaming was legalized.  
Advocates of commercial gaming’s legalization may endeavor to present doubtful or 
vacillating voters the promise that commercial gaming will benefit worthy causes even if 
the beneficiaries are generally unrelated to the industry (Anderson, 2005). 
Calcagno, Walker, and Jackson (2010) sought to go beyond the four factors that 
Furlong identified, to better understand why a state decides to legalize commercial casino 
gaming.  The researchers used a tobit model to weigh factors they determined were 
appropriate.  The authors reasoned that a tobit model was appropriate since two questions 
needed to be considered.  The first variables the researchers chose were adopted to 
represent the state’s fiscal conditions and constraints that could conceivably motivate 
legislators to legalize commercial gaming.  These fiscal variables included short-term 
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debt, long-term debt, state revenue per capita and per capita federal government transfers 
to the state, along with a dummy variable that indicated whether the state in question had 
a tax and expenditure limit. 
Calcagno et al. (2010) also incorporated a dummy variable to examine the influence 
of political alignment.  The researchers focused on the state governor’s political 
affiliation as well as whether the state was unified under either the Republican or 
Democratic Party.  Additionally, the study incorporated variables for intrastate gambling 
competition.  These variables included: dog betting, horse betting, lottery sales and 
square footage of Native American casino gaming, which served as a proxy for tribal 
gaming volume since Native American tribes are not required to disclose their revenue 
data.  
 Besides exploring demographic variables which help to understand the 
characteristics of the residents, the study integrated variables that attempted to measure 
the impact of inter-state competition.  The researchers examined the existence of border 
rivers, whether bordering states host commercial gaming casinos and whether border 
states host Native American tribal casinos.  Finally, the study accounted for the size of 
the state in an effort to control for the convenience factor involved in visiting a 
neighboring state to engage in gaming activities.  The study concluded that evidence 
existed to support the notion that casinos are adopted in order to reduce fiscal pressures 
particularly with regard to long term debt and current state revenues.  In addition, the 
findings suggested that keeping residents who wish to gamble in-state and attracting 
tourist are both goals associated with the legalization of commercial casino gaming 
(Calcagno et al., 2010).  
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Expansion of Commercial Gaming 
United States commercial casino gaming has expanded from Nevada to New Jersey, 
the Gulf Coast, the Midwest “riverboat” states, and onward.  Although differences in 
regulatory structures designed to ensure the integrity of the industry are largely 
superficial, significant variation exists with regard to the purported communal purpose 
legal gaming brings to the individual state’s society and economy.  Although a slight 
generalization, the two approaches are often referred to as the “Nevada” model and the 
“New Jersey” model (National Gambling Impact Study Commission [NGISC], 1999). 
The “Nevada” model is distinguished by viewing commercial gaming as another 
business with the recognition that a particular collection of safeguards are necessitated.  
The “Nevada” model most significantly differs in that it suggests that the public purpose 
of commercial gaming is to generate the greatest amount of economic benefits for the 
state and its residents.  These aforementioned benefits include jobs, investments, and tax 
revenues.  The governmental regulatory function is confined to the tasks of guarding the 
integrity of the games and deterring organized crime (NGISC, 1999). 
Nevada legalized casinos and other types of gaming in 1931.  The industry was 
distinguished by strong profits but suffered by its inability to raise financial capital 
through mainstream debt and/or equity financing and therefore relied on more 
questionable and creative sources of financing.  This climate changed with the 1969 
Corporate Gaming Act which permitted publically traded companies to hold gaming 
licenses (Eadington, 1999). 
Commercial gaming advocates suggest that Nevada serves as a “case study” in 
structuring gaming tax rates that encourage economic development and generate a stream 
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of benefits for the state (Christiansen, 2003).  Nevada currently assesses the commercial 
gaming industry with a graduated tax rate with a maximum tax of 6.75% on gross gaming 
revenue, but also imposes added fees and levies that contribute approximately and 
addition 1% to the overall gaming tax bill (American Gaming Association, 2010).  
Gaming advocates further point out that the states with the lowest tax rates support the 
highest number of gaming related jobs and maximize capital investment (Christiansen, 
2005). 
Furthermore, the “Nevada” model stresses providing the commercial gaming industry 
with a comparatively free environment to react to the demands of the market, particularly 
with respect to quantity of facilities and their location.  The “Nevada” model is widely 
regarded as a vital factor in the state of Nevada’s status as a nucleus of commercial 
gaming. 
In contrast, the “New Jersey” model pays particular attention to the potential 
negatives associated with commercial gaming and places an emphasis on what 
differentiates commercial gaming from other businesses.  This approach tends to be 
accompanied by a more comprehensive and involved function for government.  
Ultimately, the “New Jersey” model reflects a societal view that commercial gambling is 
potentially a threat to the community but simultaneously is capable of generating 
substantial benefits providing the industry is judiciously controlled.  For example, when 
New Jersey legalized commercial gaming in 1976, the explicit goal was not to build a 
new cornerstone state industry but instead to assist in revitalizing a dilapidated resort 
community (NGISC, 1999). 
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New Jersey was significant in that the original legalization of commercial gaming 
was extremely controversial but eventually the existence of casinos in Atlantic City 
became largely accepted by the community.  The state imposed a rigid and far-reaching 
regulatory entity and left few issues beyond state oversight and sanction.  Also of note is 
the fact that decades after the arguably successful legalization of commercial casino 
gaming in Atlantic City, New Jersey has not permitted the industry to expand beyond the 
initial base of the resort community. 
The riverboat casino states followed the “New Jersey” model (NGISC, 1999).  The 
riverboat states legalized commercial gaming operations with the objective of generating 
economic expansion in a set number of locales.  In other words, commercial gaming was 
to be restricted to what amounted to enterprise zones created to provide economic 
benefits to the surrounding communities.  The benefits were the growth in employment 
opportunities, capital investment, tax revenue, and enhanced tourism.  The rewards and 
inherent threats emanating from the legalization of commercial gaming would be 
confined to a finite number of locations.  The various riverboat states have followed this 
approach to varying degrees. 
The initial confinement of gambling to riverboats reflected that the states intended to 
separate gambling both physically and symbolically from the general community as well 
as to emphasize the restricted role gambling was to serve, both with respect to economic 
impacts and societal threats.  
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Native American Gaming Overview 
While not directly addressed in the research, this review would be remiss if it failed to 
mention the impact and significance of the tribal gaming model.  Significant-scaled 
Native American gaming was initiated post 1987 which marked the landmark decision 
rendered by the United States Supreme Court in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission 
Indians.  The US Supreme Court supported the tribe’s opposition to state regulation by 
refuting a state’s ability to regulate commercial gaming in Native American reservations.  
The Court’s decision directly resulted in Congress passing the Indian Gaming Regulatory 
Act (IGRA) the following year.  The IGRA served multiple purposes including: 
stipulating that revenues from gaming be utilized to further economic development and 
the well-being of tribes, and identifying various procedures and requirements.  
Additionally, the act declared that Class III gambling, which comprises what is typically 
recognized as casino gambling, requires a compact between a tribe and the state within 
whose confines they wish to do business (NGISC, 1999). 
The United States Supreme Court decision combined with the passing of IGRA that 
followed contributed to what can conservatively be characterized as a brisk expansion of 
tribal gaming.  Revenues from gambling at Native American casinos grew from $212 
million in 1988 to $6.7 billion in 1997 (NGISC, 1999).  In 2009, the National Indian 
Gaming Association reported gross revenues (unadjusted) of $26.2 billion.  Currently, 
237 Native American tribes are involved with Indian gaming in 28 U.S. states (National 
Indian Gaming Association, 2009). 
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Illinois Overview 
The Midwestern State of Illinois ratified the Riverboat Gambling Act in February of 
1990.  In so doing, Illinois became the second of the United States to legalize riverboat 
gambling, the first state being Iowa.    Additionally, the Riverboat Gambling Act created 
the Illinois Gaming Board, which was immediately authorized to award up to 10 
commercial casino licenses.  Approximately a year and a half later in September of 1991, 
the first riverboat in Alton began operation.  Illinois awarded all ten of its licenses by 
1996 to operators in the subsequent communities:  Alton, Aurora, East Dubuque, East St. 
Louis, Elgin, Joliet, Metropolis, Peoria, and Rock Island ( Illinois Riverboat, 1990). 
Supporters of the legislation believed that riverboats would bring numerous benefits 
to the state.  These benefits included stimulating the economies of Illinois riverboat 
towns, generating tax revenues, promoting job growth, and increasing tourism.  
Supporters also recognized that much of Iowa’s already legal riverboat business was 
generated from Illinois residents and were interested in keeping those tax revenues in 
Illinois (Marbach, 1999). 
Five members, appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate, comprised the 
Illinois Gaming Board.  Besides licensing riverboats, the Gaming Board was tasked with 
administering the tax collection and the regulatory system for Illinois riverboat casino 
operations.  Ultimately the Board is responsible for safeguarding the integrity of the 
state’s commercial gaming operations in part by conducting criminal and financial 
background investigations on applicants for casino licensure. 
A gaming license enables each riverboat operator in Illinois to provide up to 1,200 
gaming positions.  The gaming positions may be comprised of a combination of 
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electronic gaming devices and table games.   The number of gamblers playing at a 
particular riverboat is determined by the number of positions.  The positions in Illinois 
are comprised in the following manner: positions for electronic device games such as 
slots make up 90 percent of the total devices offered, a craps table is considered to have 
ten gaming positions, and games using live gaming devices are counted as offering five 
gaming positions (Illinois Gaming Board Staff, 2000).  Electronic gaming devices 
(EGD’s) include as previously mentioned slots but also Video Lottery Terminals (VLT’s) 
pull-tab machines and video poker .   Although initially the riverboats were obligated to 
conduct cruises, by amending the Illinois Gambling Act in 1999, Illinois permitted 
operators to remain permanently moored at their docksites (Illinois Riverboat, 1990). 
The Illinois Riverboat Gaming Act directly expresses that the legislative intent behind 
the legalization of commercial gaming is to assist economic development, to promote 
tourism, and to increase revenues available for assisting and supporting education.  The 
Act also recognizes the importance of providing regulatory provisions to ensure the 
credibility and maintenance of public confidence related to gaming operations.  
Specifically, the regulatory process is designed to provided oversight of facilities, 
persons, associations and practices associated with the operation of commercial gaming 
facilities  (Illinois Riverboat, 1990).  Figure 1 provides an overview of the Illinois Casino 
industry with regard to location of riverboats. 
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Figure 1.  2003 Illinois Gaming Taxation Rates as reported by each riverboat. Adapted 
from Illinois Gaming Board. (2003). 2003 Annual report.   
 
 
 
 
 
     2003 Adjusted Gross Revenue 
1. Grand Victoria  (Elgin)               $380,701,240 
2. Hollywood Casino
1
 (Aurora)  $246,866,057 
3. Empress (Joliet)   $232,925,884 
4. Harrah’s Casino (Joliet)   $269,772,752 
5. Casino Rock Island (Rock Island) $39,493,811 
6. Par-A-Dice Casino (Peoria)  $138,126,316 
7. Alton Belle (Alton)   $109,083,084 
8. Casino Queen (E St. Louis)  $158,033,927 
9. Harrah’s Metropolis Casino  $134,940,409 
 
Chicago 
Peoria 
St. Louis, Mo 
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Iowa Overview 
The State of Iowa passed the Pari-Mutuel Wagering Act in May of 1983.  This is 
significant because it lead to the establishment of the five member Racing Commission.  
While the Commission initially concerned itself with the licensure and regulation of pari-
mutuel horse and dog racing, the entity eventually evolved into the Iowa Racing and 
Gaming Commission whose task it is to administer regulations and laws on pari-mutuel 
betting at racetracks and excursion boat gambling along with the other gaming related 
venues legal in the State of Iowa (Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission, n.d). 
Legislation enacted in July of 1989 permitted the Commission to grant excursion boat 
licenses to organizations determined to be qualified, providing the approval of the 
proposition by a county electorate referendum.  During 1989, six referenda produced five 
county approvals and one denial, which lead to the commission’s granting of five 
excursion riverboat licenses beginning in 1990.  This first boat, the Emerald Lady began 
operation in Burlington, Ft. Madison and Keokuk on May 10, 1991 (Iowa Racing and 
Gaming Commission, n.d.). 
Further legislation enacted in March of 1994 resulted in multiple changes to Iowa 
riverboat gaming:  The $200 a day loss limit and $5 maximum hand wager limit was 
removed, the minimum capacity of a riverboat was decreased from 500 to 250 persons, 
the requirement that no more than 30% of the vessel be utilized for gambling was 
revoked, the prohibition against dockside gambling was eliminated and lastly, riverboats 
were able to conduct gambling 24 hours a day.  Licensed Iowa riverboats began operation 
of unlimited gambling in June, 1994 (Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission, n.d.). 
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The final meaningful legislation enacted prior to the end of the focus of this research 
occurred in May of 2004.  Iowa incorporated the moored barge into the redefinition of 
what constitutes an “Excursion gambling boat”.  This formally removed the requirement 
that a gaming riverboat must leave the dock at any time.  Furthermore the May legislation 
also removed the requirement that a riverboat must reside on a river.  Excursion boats 
could be located on man-made lakes or reservoirs with only a few additional stipulations.  
Finally, in conjunction with the aforementioned regulatory easing, the gaming tax 
structure was reworked to the disadvantage of the operators (Iowa Racing and Gaming 
Commission, unknown). 
A visual representation of the Iowa riverboat market in 2003 is presented in Figure 2.  
The location of the operators is indicated by the placement of the dice and a table is 
provided that indicates operator names in addition to revenues from that year. 
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Figure 2.  2003 Iowa Gaming Taxation Rates as reported by each riverboat. Adapted 
from Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission. (2003). 2003 Annual report.   
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      2003 Adjusted Gross Revenue 
 1.Harrah’s Casino & Hotel (Council    Bluffs) $111,062.938 
2. Ameristar Casino & Hotel (Council Bluffs) $152,109,549 
3. Isle of Capri Marquette    $  41,697,764 
4. Diamond Jo Casino (Dubuque)   $  53,528,860 
5. Catfish Bend Casino (Fort Madison/Burlington) $  29,047,542 
6. Mississippi Belle II (Clinton)   $  28,228,331 
7. Belle of  Sioux City (Argosy) (Sioux City) $  42,391,801 
8. Rhythm City Casino (Davenport)  $  71,727,957 
9. Isle of Capri-Bettendorf    $104,088,011 
10 Lakeside Casino (Osceola)   $  60.419,5698 
  
* 
  
  
 
Dubuque 
Davenport 
Omaha, Ne 
Sioux City 
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Indiana Overview 
In 1988, 62% of state voters chose to revoke the ban on gaming from the Indiana 
constitution.  Riverboat gaming was specifically legalized with the passage of the 1993 
Riverboat Gambling Act (PolicyAnalytics, 2006).  The Act declares that an owner’s 
initial license expires after five years.  Subsequently, an analysis is performed to assess 
the licensee’s compliance with the initial agreements and compliance to city and county 
requirements (Littlepage, Payton, & Atibil, 2004).   
The Riverboat Gambling Act directly led to the authorization of 11 riverboats in 
1993.  Of the 11 excursion boats, five were to be located on the Ohio River, five were 
authorized on Lake Michigan, and one riverboat approved on Patoka Lake.  By 
December 1995, the first Indiana riverboat Aztar opened in Evansville.  Five commercial 
gaming riverboats opened in 1996.  The locations of the riverboats (see Figure 3) are on 
the northern and southern extremes of the state.  The significance of the regulations 
determining locations are that riverboats positioned close to population concentrations 
outside of the state should encourage patronage by non-residents.  Furthermore, 
regulations placing locations distantly from in-state population centers such as 
Indianapolis and Fort Wayne serve as a disincentive for in-state patronage.   This policy 
was adopted with the intention of holding down consumption by Indiana citizens and 
thereby mitigating the social costs associated with the gaming industry (PolicyAnalytics, 
2006).  
In 2002 and 2003, Indiana modified its gaming regulations.  In 2002, regulators 
decided to allow riverboats to remain at dockside.  In 2003, regulations further changed 
to allow the restriction limiting ownership from one license to two and operators were 
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allowed to stay open 24 hours and seven days a week (Indiana Gaming Commission, 
2002). 
A visual representation of the Indiana riverboat market in 2003 is presented in Figure 
3.  The location of the operators is indicated by the placement of the dice and a table is 
provided that indicates operator names in addition to revenues from that year. 
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Figure 3.  2003 Indiana Gaming Taxation Rates as reported by each riverboat. Adapted 
from Indiana Gaming Commission. (2003). 2003 Annual report to the governer.   
 
 
      2003 CY Adjusted Gross Revenue 
      (Reported as Total Win by IGC) 
1. Argosy (Lawrenceberg)   $411,069,238 
2. Belterra Casino (Belterra)  $132,003,822 
3. Blue Chip (Michigan City)  $221,378,109 
4. Caesar's Indiana Casino (Elizabeth) $279,305,695 
5. Casino Aztar (Evansville)  $114,883,387 
6. Grand Victoria Casino (Rising Sun) $141,575,753 
7. Horseshoe Casino (Hammond)  $350,761,471 
8. Majestic Star 1 (Gary)   $136,594,710 
9. Majestic Star II Trump(Gary)  $134,680,747 
10. Resorts East Chicago (Hammond) $307,610,349 
 
  
East Chicago & 
Gary 
“Chicagoland Area” 
Cincinnati, OH 
Louisville, KY 
Evansville 
Indianapolis 
Fort Wayne 
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Missouri Overview 
Riverboat gaming was approved in the State of Missouri in 1993 by means of 
constitutional amendment.  Missouri’s first commercial gaming riverboat license was 
awarded in 1994, this directly lead to the opening of the first Missouri riverboat, the 
Aztar in December of 1995.    
Missouri legislators changed regulations in Missouri by special session in 2002 in 
order to allow riverboats to permanently remain at dockside.  The year 2003 brought the 
creation of the first land based casino in Missouri.   Additionally in 2003, casinos were 
permitted to remain open for 24 hours and to operate seven days a week.   Finally, 
regulations also changed to authorize commercial gaming riverboat owners to hold two 
rather than just one license. 
The Missouri Gaming Commission’s historical overview of riverboat gaming 
mentions that the referendum authorizing riverboat gaming in 1992 expressed that the 
intention of the proposal was to increase General Revenue.  The referendum further 
authorized riverboat excursion gaming on the Mississippi and Missouri rivers.  
Additionally, a five hundred dollar loss limit per person per excursion was established 
(Missouri Gaming Commission, 1995).  The loss limit capped a gamblers buy-in of table 
game chips at $500 every two hours (Alm & Star, 2009).   The loss limit also applied to 
slot machine play. 
The $500 dollar loss limited was instituted to protect customers from excessive losses 
during a particular excursion.  The state recognized as early as 1994 that the loss limit 
placed Missouri at a competitive disadvantage when compared to other riverboat states 
(Missouri Gaming Commission, 1995).   Researchers posited that the removal of the loss 
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limit would increase customer volume by 12%, increase gaming revenues by $172 
million, and eliminate the inconvenience and costs associated with the boarding card 
requirements.  The boarding cards were issued when a customer arrived at the location 
and were used to monitor the loss limit.  Finally, researchers believed that the removal of 
loss limits would attract the higher-end gambler that avoided Missouri commercial 
gaming locations specifically because of the loss limits and the higher-end gambler had 
the potential of contributing $136 million to gaming revenue (McGowan & Islam, 2003). 
Missouri voters repealed the loss limit requirement and the changes went into effect 
on November 7, 2008.  Following the repeal, it was reported that January 2009 gaming 
revenues were up 6.3% over the previous year when neighboring states like Iowa and 
Illinois both experienced declining revenues.  Executives from the casino industry 
attributed the increase in admissions and revenues to the regulatory changes (Alm & Star, 
2009). 
A visual representation of the Missouri riverboat market in 2003 is presented in 
Figure 4.  The location of the operators is indicated by the placement of the dice and a 
table is provided that indicates operator names in addition to revenues from that year. 
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Figure 4.  2003 Missouri Gaming Taxation Rates as reported by each riverboat. Adapted 
from Missouri Gaming Commission. (2003). 2003 Annual report to the general 
assembly.   
 
 
      2003 Adjusted Gross Revenues 
1. Ameristar (Kansas City)  $243,416,463 
2. Ameristar (St. Charles)   $ 209,781,150 
3. Argosy (Riverside)   $   95,640,371 
4. Aztar (Caruthersville)   $   22,229,139 
5. Harrah’s (Maryland Heights)  $ 236,562,047 
6. Harrah’s (North Kansas City)  $ 207,873,039 
7. Isle of Capri (Boonville)  $   66,209,745 
8. Isle of Capri (Kansas City)  $   99,271,902 
9. Mark Twain (LaGrange)  $   25,057,956 
10. President Casino on the Admiral $   73,443,945 
11. St Jo Frontier Casino (St. Joseph) $   25,642,429 
  
 
Kansas City 
St Louis 
27 
 
Taxation and Regulation of Commercial Casinos 
The positive influence of commercial gaming includes among others the regeneration 
of tired resort communities, and employee opportunities.  Gambling proponents prefer to 
emphasize the economic advantages that legalized gaming brings to the surrounding 
community.  One of these benefits are the enhanced tax revenues  (NGISC, 1999).  
Furthermore, state and local governments often consider gaming as a way to increase 
government revenues by means other than raising existing taxes.  The revenues generated 
by the gaming industry are often viewed as not directly collected from within the 
community (Przybylski & Littlepage, 1997).  Another advantage governments rely on 
when advocating gaming and the related collection of gaming taxes and fees is that the 
community apparently does perceive the taxation related to gambling activities (Borg, 
Mason, & Shapiro, 1991). 
While gaming has emerged to play an increasingly significant role in state and 
regional economies, nowhere is commercial gaming viewed as simply another business.  
The implication is that there exists an assumption, of questionable empirically based 
merit, suggesting that if left unchecked and without oversight, commercial gaming would 
result in a myriad of negative impacts on the surrounding community.  Therefore, 
government involvement through regulation and taxation is the most suitable solution and 
as such, the legalization of commercial gambling has consistently been supplemented 
with a regulatory entity charged with the industry’s oversight  (NGISC, 1999). 
When discussing casino taxation it is of importance to differentiate between 
commercial casinos and other forms of regulated gambling.  For example, based on a 
1987 Supreme Court decision, Native American casinos are not subject to state taxation 
28 
 
or regulation.   It is important to note that although states are not permitted to tax Native 
American casinos, many states have entered into informal revenue splitting arrangements 
with Native American gaming operators (Anderson, 2005). 
Prior research into the commercial gaming industry reveals that states have been far 
from consistent in their imposition of fees and taxes on the commercial gaming industry 
(Prum & Bybee, 1999).   Nevertheless, taxation of commercial casino gaming can 
generally be classified into three different forms:  Wagering taxes, admissions taxes, and 
fees.  Researchers have suggested that the gaming industry has relied on the promise of 
the potential support these various taxes and fees can provide to the local community.  As 
such, the tax revenues are often initially earmarked for specific causes. 
While a degree of variation exists between states regarding exact definitions, the 
wagering or gaming tax is basically a construct of adjusted gross revenues which are 
typically referred to as AGR.  AGR is calculated by subtracting payouts from gross 
gambling receipts.  Admission taxes are primarily levied in the riverboat casino states.   
If an admission tax is applied, each guest is required to pay the fee upon boarding the 
riverboat or entering the casino.  In certain states such as Iowa the revenues generated by 
admission taxes are divided between the state and the local community.  Admission fees 
in some riverboat states have varied with the size of the facility or the number of persons 
that visited the operator in the previous year.  
 Various other fees and taxes are required in many states. The most significant with 
regard to this research into the riverboat states is the licensing tax.  Since Illinois has 
limited the number of riverboats to ten, licensing allows an operator to enter into a market 
with finite competition from within the state.  Limited licenses as well as position limits 
29 
 
prevent one operator with larger capital reserves to dominate.  The final license in Illinois 
was awarded to Midwest Gaming in March of 2010.  The operator paid $125 million for 
Illinois’ only available casino license and thereby received the right to operate a casino in 
Des Plaines, Illinois. 
Prum and Bybee (1999) noted that simplicity of gaming taxation was advantageous 
but less important than the goal of accumulating funds for government purposes.  In 
addition to simplicity, stability in taxes and fees is of great importance to casino 
operators.  Increases in taxes and/or fees serves as a disincentive to further investment 
and may diminish the returns of an investment (Prum & Bybee, 1999). 
Tax Theory 
Pygovian tax theory attributed to Pigou (1920) has been utilized by economists to 
recognize that indirect taxation can be utilized to counteract injustices inherent in the 
allocation of certain resources.  The taxes are essentially efforts to counteract for 
inefficiencies created when resources are not distributed either equally or fairly.    The 
concept is particularly useful if the externalities related to the generator are of the public 
good or bad sort and negotiations between the beneficiary and cost bearer is impossible.  
For example, commercial gaming in the riveboat states is restricted due to the limited 
allotment of gaming licenses.  Furthermore, neither the gaming industry nor licensing 
entities dispute that legalized commercial gaming results in certain costs to the 
community – problem gambling and its impacts.  In more simple terms, pigovian taxes 
serve to adjust for either positive or negative influences of a particular industry or 
business.  A tax or a price on the generator of a perceived negative externality should 
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reflect the impact that generator inflicts by their production of a product or service on 
others (Sandmo, 1975).   
Pygovian taxation has also been referred to as “sin taxes” or taxes that attempt to 
account for negative externalities related to a business or marketing activity.  Gaming has 
of course been an industry that has been subject to this form or theory of taxation.  The 
adoption of a Pygovian taxation policy is alleged to bring various counterproductive 
repercussions.  Pygovian taxation will certainly lower profits and may result in job and 
investment losses, in addition to which the policy may create a climate of moral hazard 
for policy makers who simultaneously rely on the pygovian tax revenue while professing 
to curb the related behavior or negative consumption. 
A distinction is often drawn between Pygovian taxation and what is frequently termed 
“sin taxes”.  While Pigovian taxation professes to retrieve funds fairly, commensurate 
with the damage the industry inflicts, the use of sin taxes in practice rarely is reflective of 
any attempt to accurately measure damage or harm.  In the case of commercial gaming, 
attempts to quantify the costs and benefits have been largely disappointing due to the 
complexity of the task ( NGISC, 1999).  Commercial gaming’s current tax environment 
is to some degree the result of gambling’s history as a “vice” and the related historical 
perceptions (Meich, 2008). 
Another gaming taxation approach legislatures may conceivably adopt might be 
based on optimal taxation theory.  This theory reflects an economic methodology that 
tries to structure tax policy to serve social welfare most effectively.  This goal is achieved 
by mitigating deadweight costs.  Deadweight costs are defined as economic inefficiencies 
produced by taxation.  These deadweight costs are related to elasticity of supply and 
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demand for a good or service.  Legislators setting taxation policy based on an optimal 
taxation theory approach would place the highest tax rate on the goods or services that 
are characterized by being the most inelastic with respect to demand (Meich, 2008).  The 
criticisms of optimal taxation are abundant but the primary condemnation is that the 
taxation approach is regressive, that is it poses a greater burden on those with less means 
(Lundahl & Ndulu, 1996). 
Gaming Taxation and Price Elasticity 
Various aspects of gaming taxation have been examined by researchers in an attempt 
to understand the impact and nature of both the cost and benefit of commercial gaming to 
the society.  The issue of regressivity was investigated by Suits (1977a).  The researcher 
used an index of tax progressivity he developed in earlier research (Suits, 1977b).  The 
index generates a score ranging from a +1 at the extreme end of tax progressivity which 
occurs when the entire tax burden is sustained by those of the highest income bracket, 
and -1 at the other extreme when the entire tax burden is borne by the members of the 
lowest income bracket.  Various forms of gambling were examined, including (as 
described by Suits): Horses at the track, state lotteries, casino games, numbers, sports 
cards, off-track betting parlors, and sports books.  Gambling taxes were found in 
aggregate to be regressive, scoring a -.25, but there was significant variation among the 
various forms of gambling with respect to the regressivity or progressivity score.  For 
example, Suits (1977a) found that casino games related gambling were actually 
progressive (.26) when he examined the U.S. population.  In contrast, when Suits (1977a) 
focused on Nevada residents exclusively, the researcher found the casino gambling tax to 
be profoundly regressive.  This trend repeated itself when the researcher focused on 
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sports books.  Suits suggested that the difference in determining which public income 
sector of the carries the tax burden of gaming taxes on casino games and sports books 
was attributed to the difficulty and cost for most of the US population to access casinos at 
the time of the research.  In other words, the cost of travel works to screen out various 
income groups which skews attempts to quantify tax burden.  The researcher goes on to 
suggest that once the casino games are located close to home, poor people are more 
attracted to slot machines and table games than wealthier residents of the same area 
(Suits, 1977a).  Suits was later criticized for using a global format approach; which 
examined both gamblers and non-gamblers when reaching his conclusion that travel costs 
constituted the primary difference between the regressiveness of the gaming tax when he 
compared in-state and out-of-state gamblers (Rivenbark, 1998).   
   Criticism of the global approach led researchers to measure the tax burden of 
commercial casino customers by combining their taxes directly and non-gamblers who 
contributed to the tax by the indirect means of traveling to gaming regions (Borg, Mason, 
& Shapiro, 1990; Mason, Shapiro, & Borg, 1989).   Mason et al. (1989) split visitors into 
three distinct groups: Las Vegas residents (Clark County), non-Las Vegas Nevada 
residents, and non-Nevada visitors.  Using log-linear regression, the researchers 
concluded that the gaming tax was most regressive for the individuals who had the 
closest distance to casinos.  However, in contrast to the Suits’ analysis, Mason et al. 
found that the gaming tax was universally regressive regardless of a gambler’s residence. 
Rivenbark (1998) assessed the tax incidence of casino gaming in the state of 
Mississippi.  The study focused on both Mississippi’s counties that hosted casinos as well 
as counties that did not offer casino gaming.  The researcher utilized log-inear regression 
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to discover that although both locations were regressive with respect to gaming taxes, 
counties with casino gaming proved to be significantly more regressive than counties 
without casinos.  Ultimately, the majority of prior investigation into the regressive nature 
of casino and lottery taxation confirms that regressivity appears to be an undeniable facet 
of any gaming tax. 
In contrast, casino gamblers were more likely than non-gamblers to have increased 
their savings and to have decreased their debt when surveyed in 2006, in addition to 
having higher incomes.  Gamblers were significantly more likely to be planning and 
setting aside funds for their retirement than non-gamblers (Harrah's, 2006).  Harrah’s 
surveys from other years offered similar observations.    
There exists a measure of disagreement regarding the validity of conducting any 
distributional analysis on voluntary taxation (Rivenbark, 1998).  Researchers have 
defended their research into the incidence of gaming taxation by noting the similarity 
between their gaming taxation inquiry and prior investigation into other types of 
compulsory or sumptuary excise taxes (Borg et al., 1991; Mikesell & Zorn, 1988; 
Rivenbark, 1998).  Brinner and Clotlerfelter (1975) objected to the comparison between 
gambling taxes and sumptuary excise taxes, suggesting that one form of taxation is 
employed to discourage consumption while the other is adopted with the expressed 
purpose of generating revenues. 
Additionally, differences exist between gaming taxation and compulsory taxation that 
are important to note.  Gaming operations offer an environment that attempts to induce 
unlimited spending compared with a product such as tobacco.  Gaming enterprises such 
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as lotteries and progressive slot machines offer the promise of the possibility of becoming 
“set for life”(Brinner & Clotfelter, 1975; Rivenbark, 1998).      
Researchers have commented when examining taxation on state lottery games that 
players are only marginally cognizant of the related odds the gaming tax rates associated 
with the lottery (Clotfelter & Cook, 1987).  While no similar investigation into the 
consumer awareness of gaming tax rates or odds of commercial gaming has been 
undertaken to the knowledge of this researcher, it is reasonable to suspect that the 
understanding or non-awareness of gaming tax rates would be similar and the awareness 
of the related odds of play would vary between types of game and between skill level of 
player.  For example, it is largely impossible for players to know the par of a particular 
slot machine but a skilled player can assess the odds of a video poker game accurately 
(Kilby, Fox, & Lucas, 2004; Lucas & Kilby, 2008).  Par is defined as “the expected value 
associated with each slot machine’s pay table” (Lucas & Brandmeir, 2005).  That is the 
percentage the operator can expect to retain as revenues when payouts are subtracted 
from the amount wagered 
Suits (1979) also addressed the issue of the elasticity of gaming demand with regard 
to gaming taxation.  Suits focused on bookmaking in Nevada and pari-mutuel betting.  In 
both cases, gaming was determined to be price elastic.  The bookmakers in Nevada 
reduced the take-out rate in response to a drop in the federal tax rate and experience an 
accompanied increase in handle from $1.4 to $5 million per quarter.  Suits approached 
the price elasticity question with regard to pari-mutuel betting by comparing state law 
determined take-out rates.  Again the researcher found that pari-mutuel betting was 
relatively price elastic (Suits, 1979).   Suits’ results were further validated in later 
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research into gaming demand in the United Kingdom (Anderson, 2005).  Researchers 
investigated the significant change in the UK’s gambling taxation in October of 2001.  
Results indicated that in the United Kingdom demand for bookmaking-related gambling 
was profoundly impacted by the rate of gambling taxation. As such, bookmakers 
experienced a significant increase in demand for betting when the rate of taxation 
declined (Paton, Siegel, & Williams, 2004).   
Eadington (1999) found further evidence to support the notion that gamblers are 
extremely price sensitive when he compared American roulette with European roulette.  
Both forms of the game pay 35 to 1 for single number wagers, however American 
roulette offers numbers 1 to 36 along with both a zero and a double zero.  In contrast, 
European roulette offers the same 1 to 36 numbers but only has a single zero.  As a result, 
American roulette is precisely twice as expensive to play.  This translates into a 
significant difference in demand for the game.   American roulette in the state of Nevada, 
at the time of Eadington’s study, accounted for approximately 8.3% of table game win.  
European roulette on the other hand was often the dominant revenue generator among 
table games.  The game of roulette in the United Kingdom in 1997 accounted for over 
60% of table game drop (Eadington, 1999). Incidentally, the contribution of roulette 
appears to have remained relatively consistent with Nevada roulette contributing 8.9% to 
table game win in 2009 (Nevada State Gaming Control Board, 2010). 
The value of Suits’(1979), Paton et al.’s (2004), and Eadington’s (1999) insights into 
price elasticity is of limited value to this research for a number of important reasons:  The 
slot player is not informed of the house advantage of each wager which is the price of 
play (Lucas & Kilby 2008).  Furthermore researchers discovered that changes to the price 
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a gambler pays to play a slot machine or synonymously the machine’s par is not 
perceptible to slot players (Lucas & Brandmeier, 2005).  Therefore if one were to assume 
that an operator changed the par of its slot machines in response to a change in state or 
local gaming tax rates, this alteration would not be conveyed to the player by either direct 
means such as an explicit verbal or written correspondence or by indirect means such as 
the general perception that the slot machines were altered to a higher par. 
Ahlgren, Dalbor, and Singh (2009) examined the impact of Illinois’ 2003 gaming tax 
increase with respect to its impact on gaming demand.  The study used a multiple linear 
regression with the period of the 70% tax step represented by a dummy variable to model 
the tax rate change.   A Box Jenkins model was subsequently used to resolve 
autocorrelation issues related to the time series.  The researchers discovered that the tax 
rate increase resulted in a statistically significant decrease in gaming demand. 
Ozurumba and Kim (2009) attempted to determine revenue-maximization tax rates 
for states that host commercial casino gaming.  The researchers used a Laffer curve to 
identify the revenue-maximization rate.  This approach is similar to the methodology 
Garrett (2009) chose to determine the optimal state tax rate to maximize revenues 
generated by state lotteries.  The concept underpinning the research was that raising taxes 
beyond a certain point reduces annual gaming tax revenue by diminishing the marginal 
return on revenue.  Ozurumba and Kim (2009) posited that when a tax rate is raised 
beyond a certain threshold, operators respond by reducing payoffs, adjusting hours of 
operation, and decreasing salaries.  The results of the analysis indicated that the 
commercial gaming states assessed in the analysis fell into one of four categories: States 
that overtaxed but were simultaneously close to revenue-maximizing level, states that 
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under-taxed but were close to revenue-maximizing levels, and finally, states that under-
taxed.  The state of Illinois was the lone state to occupy the first category describe as 
“Overtaxing States” (Ozurumba & Kim, 2009). 
Monetary policy and fiscal policy are the two main tools of macroeconomic 
management.   Monetary policy, controlled by the central bank, influences the economy 
by setting the money supply.  Fiscal policy refers to both government expenditures and 
taxation.  An aspect of taxation fiscal policy that this research reflects is that taxes or 
specifically tax rates are the partial determinants of the prices that both businesses and 
individuals are confronted with in markets.  It is via this relationship that incentives and 
behavior are correlated to tax rates (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 1989). 
Samuelson and Nordhaus (1989) provided an example of the relationship between 
taxation and demand by referencing the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  The Act included a 
provision making equipment more expensive on a relative basis which in turn deterred 
businesses from investing in such items.  The result of the provision contributed to 
decreased business investment and was shown to negatively impact GNP. 
Tax Rate Changes Affecting Other Industries 
The 1986 Tax Reform Act embodied the most far-reaching revision of the tax code 
since its implementation in the 1950s.  Among the various areas impacted by the 
numerous provisions included in the legislation, the real estate industry was one of the 
most affected.   The aspects of the real estate industry that were specifically targeted were 
depreciation deduction, flow-through tax losses, and marginal tax rates.  The value of real 
estate as a tax shelter was minimized due to the tax loss offset and the at-risk restrictions 
(Sanger, Sirmans, & Turnbull, 1990). 
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The research focus of Sanger et al. (1990) was the effect of both the aforementioned 
1986 Tax Reform Act and the 1976 Tax Reform Act on publically traded real estate 
firms.   The researchers narrowed their attention to the returns of real estate investment 
trusts (REITs) and other real estate corporations.  The REITs and real estate corporations 
were evaluated separately due to differences related to how the two entities are treated for 
tax purposes.  Sanger et al. utilized intervention analysis which describes the intervention 
in a time series via by using dummy variables to both model the tax change and account 
for seasonal consequences.  The results suggested that the market evaluated the changes 
to the taxation of real estate assets related to the 1976 Tax Reform Act as advantageous to 
real estate investors.  In contrast the market appraised the 1986 Tax Reform Act changes 
as having been detrimental to the interests of real estate investors. 
Smith and Woodward (1996) also examined the impact of the 1986 Tax Reform Act 
on real estate.  However, the focus of their research was the effect the tax changes had 
with respect to apartment values.  The research utilized a dummy variable to represent the 
tax change and furthermore adopted additional dummy variables to model additional 
obstacles that threatened their results.  For example, the researchers recognized that the 
degree of overbuilding in the regions that were examined needed to be controlled for.  
Lastly, the researchers acknowledged that autocorrelation was a potential problem due to 
the time-series nature of their analysis.  Tests affirmed the influence of autocorrelation 
and the Parks method was employed to address the issue.  The researchers concluded that 
the 1986 Tax Reform Act had a negative impact on apartment investments. 
Occupancy taxes are funds emitted by a lodging company to a tax collecting authority 
such as the Las Vegas Convention and Visitors Authority or various municipalities.  
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Occupancy taxes are sourced from a percentage of guest room revenue (Ninemeier, 
Perdue, & Ninemeier, 2008).  Researchers and stakeholders of the lodging industry have 
protested that legislators looking to generate revenues often rely on either implementing 
occupancy taxes or increasing their rates due to the relative political safety of such a 
change.  Since occupancy rates primarily affect travelers who are of course not 
constituents of the legislators enacting the rate increases, the assumption is that 
politicians will not be punished by their electorate (Hiemstra & Ismail, 1992).  Heimstra 
and Ismail (1992) analyzed the effects of room taxes on various segments of lodging 
operations in the United States.  The researchers concluded that the elimination of 
occupancy taxes of 9.8 % would result in a 3 % increase in occupancy rates.    In a 
follow-up effort the same researchers discovered that most of the room tax is borne by 
guests with approximately one dollar out of seven being absorbed by the lodging 
industry.  The industry is affected due to the reduction in the number of rooms sold 
compared to a scenario where the room tax was eliminated (Hiemstra & Ismail, 1993). 
Gaming Forecasting 
The Illinois Gaming Tax rate increase had the potential to impact both the behavior of 
the gaming customer and the various decision makers serving both gaming operators in 
the state of Illinois and the competing states of Indiana, Iowa, and Missouri.  Similarly, 
changes in gaming regulation have been examined for their impact on gaming demand.  
Methodologically, the following inquiries have parallels with this dissertation, 
furthermore; conceptually the following papers are pertinent to the goals of this analysis.  
As previously mentioned, changes in gaming regulation have often occurred 
simultaneously with changes in taxation.   Additionally, while the directional demand 
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impact of regulatory softening and increased gaming taxes might be diametrically 
opposed, both changes share an important characteristic.  Both events are characterized 
by the introduction of a single inflection point into a time series analysis (Eisendrath, 
2005). 
Nichols (1998b) analyzed the 1991 deregulation of the commercial gaming industry 
in Atlantic City.  Using an ARIMA model (a Box Jenkins autoregressive moving 
average), the researcher assessed the impact of regulatory changes that resulted in 
increased operating hours and increases in slot machine proliferation on gaming win.  
Incidentally, the author addressed the dilemma involved when attempting to 
operationalize gaming demand or gaming volume using casino win.  Casino win, 
synonymous with gambler losses, is also referred to as gross gaming revenue.  Gross 
gaming revenue is a problematic measure of gaming volume because it includes monies 
that are the result of casino complimentaries (comps); therefore when adding up gross 
gaming revenues the casino is counting winnings of its own cash.  Nichols argued that 
after adjusting for comp ratio (which he calculated as 8.5% of win), casino win was the 
preferable dependent variable since it did not include non-gaming revenues that impacted 
general revenue options such as EBITDA (Nichols, 1998b).  
United States Midwestern riverboat market deregulation was examined by Nichols 
(1998a).  In a response to the 1994 Illinois’ introduction of less regulated riverboat 
gambling, Iowa revamped its 1991 original strict inaugural regulations and eliminated 
mandated sailing, loss limits and space restrictions in response to 1994 Illinois’ 
introduction of less regulated riverboat gambling in 1994.  Casino win, total admissions 
and win per admission were used as dependent variables for regression analysis to control 
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for the effect of day of the week, seasonality, location, and per capita income while 
attempting to evaluate the impact of deregulation. The results indicated that deregulation 
had a significant impact on cross-border substitution, by having increased the three 
dependent variables: win, win per admission, and admission (Nichols, 1998a).  Nichols 
work with Iowa and Illinois riverboat deregulation has obvious similarities to this study’s 
investigation into the impact of gaming taxation rate changes in Illinois and the resulting 
influence on demand in the neighboring states. 
Shonkwiler (1993) chose structural time series methodology to examine the effect of 
Atlantic City commercial gaming casinos on gaming volume in Nevada.  The Shonkwiler 
research exemplifies the inclusion of an extraneous event and its impact on time series 
data.  This dissertation theoretically closely parallels the research presented in this 
Shonkwiler study since tax changes in one state are assessed with regard to their impact 
in a different state.  The researcher advocates his methodological approach by presenting 
the efficacy of structural time series modeling of linear trends with the potential for 
seasonality.  The author found that the legalization of commercial gaming in Atlantic 
City reduced Nevada gaming revenues by somewhere between 10 and 12 percent 
(Shonkwiler, 1993).  
Proximity: Impact of Distance on Demand  
Research into the impact of distance on demand for hospitality related services has 
been relatively well explored.  Earlier research occasionally addressed travel cost, which 
typically is a reflection of distance when measuring the impacts on visitor volume or 
demand.  Silberman and Klock (1986) chose Virginia Beach as a destination and used 
regression modeling to estimate the impacts of demographic variables and cost of travel 
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on visitor volume.  The researchers discovered that cost of travel, (which is a function of 
distance (Reece, 2001)), had a statistically significant impact on visitor volume 
(Silberman & Klock, 1986). 
Reece (2001) examined the effects of demographic, psychographics and distance on 
visitors to Las Vegas and Atlantic City.  The researcher relied on a censored Tobit 
regression technique to measure the impact of the independent variables on the number a 
trips households made to his two destinations.  In addition the researcher employed a 
probit model to assess the probability a household would visit the two locations of 
interest.   The most consistent finding of the analysis was that distance had a strong 
negative effect on visitation. 
Travel distance and the related monetary consequence of travel expense are an aspect 
of switching cost.  Researchers have defined switching costs as related to the effort, the 
time, and the expense of changing from doing business with one company to another 
(Baloglu, 2002; Bowen & Shoemaker, 1998; Sui & Baloglu, 2003).   The same 
researchers acknowledge the impact of this attribute on customer behavior.  Kneesel, 
Baloglu, and Millar (2010) recognized “ease of travel to” as a significant component that 
contributed to images of gaming destination when examining implications for branding. 
Shoemaker and Zemke (2005) sought to discover and identify the important reasons 
driving customer visitation to a particular casino.  The researchers asked respondents to 
rate various features with regard to their magnitude.  Respondents identified the “Easy 
drive from where I live” feature as the most meaningful.  The study concluded that 
operational attributes such as “easy to drive to from where I live” are more important to 
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the actual decision-making process of customers than elements typically regarded as 
behavior drivers such as promotional materials. 
In an effort to determine which attributes impact local slot machine players 
repatronage intentions as well what determines a players willingness to recommend a 
particular casino, Yi and Busser (2008) surveyed local slot players in Las Vegas.  The 
researchers relied on regression analyses to reveal that proximity was a factor in both 
research questions.  The results suggested that proximity increased both the intention of 
local slot players to repatriate a particular casino and also increased their willingness to 
recommend a particular casino. 
Customer Behavior 
Prospect theory provides a descriptive model of decision making under risk. The 
researchers suggest that when risk enters the decision making equation, people exhibit 
reactions inconsistent with the basic rules provided by expected utility theory.  In 
particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison to 
outcomes that are certain.  Prospect theory also provides an explanation for the public’s 
tendency to discard components in the decision making process that is shared by all 
prospects under consideration. 
Prospect theory serves as a model for this study because of a number of factors.  
This research in part addresses the reasons for changes of gaming demand in the Illinois 
riverboat market in relation to the 2003 gaming tax rate increase.  The research 
hypothesizes that when operators were faced with an elevated taxation schedule, they 
decreased their marketing budgets.  As a result of this decrease, customers were forced to 
pay for parking expenses and the entry fees were no longer comped by the operators.  In 
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addition, the calculations determining which customers received benefits such as free 
buffets became more stringent. 
Prospect theory provides a descriptive model of decision making under risk. The 
researchers suggest that when risk enters the decision making equation, people exhibit 
reactions inconsistent with the basic rules provided by expected utility theory.  In 
particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison to 
outcomes that are certain.  Prospect theory also provides an explanation for the public’s 
tendency to discard components in the decision making process that is shared by all 
prospects under consideration. 
The second major contribution prospect theory offers to this particular research is 
the concept of isolation effect.  The phenomenon of isolation effect is not addressed in 
expected utility theory and describes the tendency of individuals to discount components 
that are shared by all prospects under consideration (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
Expected utility theory is less applicable in the case of this data because it provides no 
explanation for why gaming activity began to climb back towards previous levels prior to 
when Illinois rescinded the gaming tax increase.   Isolation theory provides an 
explanation for why when customers, upon discovering that the majority of competing 
Illinois riverboats had adopted the same scaled-back comp and promo policies, 
discounted the importance of the changes and began to return to their previous behavior. 
Disappointment theory described by David Bell (1985) serves to provide some 
explanation for why customers model behavior described by Kahneman and Tversky’s 
(1979) certainty and isolation effect.   Disappointment is described as an outcome that 
does not match up to expectations.  The context of an event can impact the perceived 
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utility of an outcome.  For example the happiness experienced winning the top prize or 
$10,000 in a lottery may be greater than winning the lowest prize of $10,000 in a 
different drawing.  The research also recognizes that a decision maker is willing to part 
with a premium paid in monetary or other terms to avoid disappointment.   
The concept of equity theory was introduced to the discipline of business and 
marketing by way of the inquiry that was grounded in social psychological models of 
consumer decision making (Hunt & Kernan, 1991; Oliver & DeSarbo, 1988; Oliver & 
Swan, 1989).  Conceptually, customers’ reaction to treatment perceived as inequitable 
has the potential to produce damaging effects on the well-being of an organization.   
Recently, timely research with respect to the economic downturn has been 
initiated in an attempt to understand how customer demotion affects customer loyalty.  
The term demotion in this context describes the reassignment of a customer to a lower 
status that typically results in a loss of benefits.  A great deal of research has focused on 
the positive aspects of hierarchical loyalty programs and their impacts but little has been 
done to attempt to understand what occurs when people lose status in such programs.  
Wagner, Hennig-Thurau, and Rudolph (2009) investigated customer demotions and 
hypothesized that alterations in customer status provide an asymmetric negative impact 
on customer loyalty.  A methodology that relied on proprietary sales data validated the 
hypothesis and confirmed that loyalty intentions were lower for customers who had been 
demoted to a level than was evident for customers who had never achieved a higher 
status. 
Heskett, Jones, Loveman, Sasser, and Schlesinger (2008) suggested that 
customers define value in terms of what a customer receives or experiences weighed 
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against what total costs are encountered.  Costs can both be the economic price of a 
transaction as well as other costs like time lost.  While the internal quality, or the feelings 
that a company’s employee’s hold towards their position, co-workers, and towards the 
operator that they are employed by is the most significant driver of worker satisfaction 
and is the first link to the service-profit chain, eventually the customers become the 
arbiters of the experience.  An important catalyst of employee satisfaction is the ability or 
perception of the ability to meet a customer’s needs.  In terms of the Illinois riverboat 
example presented in this research, customers that expected complimentary privileges 
were denied such benefits as free access to boats and no longer received complimentary 
tickets to the buffet.  This retraction of marketing and promotional spending inevitably 
resulted in customer dissatisfaction. 
   In such a scenario the employees will be the individuals required explain the 
policies and attempt to address the situation without the ability to meet the customer’s 
need in light of the new policies.  The service-profit chain suggests that this scenario is 
likely to increase turnover and therefore negatively impact profits (Heskett et al., 2008).  
With respect to the subject matter in this dissertation, one could easily imagine that 
severe cuts in labor expenses and cuts in the ability to treat guests adequately must result 
in a degree of internal disharmony among employees.  For example, customer complaints 
may increase stress on line employees who are unable to rectify the situation and become 
frustrated and therefore treat guests in a poor manner, thereby invoking the wrath of 
managers who are brought in as the situation escalates.  
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
 This chapter begins with the presentation of the hypotheses to be tested.  
Secondly, the sources and types of data that were analyzed are discussed.  Next, 
dependent and independent variables are identified along with the statistical methodology 
appropriate for analysis.   Finally, the chapter ends with a detailed overview of the 
assumptions pertaining to the study’s analysis, particularly with regard to the use of time 
series data and a description of appropriate methods used to counter violations of the 
related assumptions. 
 The hypotheses are presented in sections beginning with the most significant to 
the goals of the analysis.  The first section contains hypotheses related to the question of 
whether a gaming company in Illinois reacted to the potential of increased gaming taxes 
by decreasing marketing/promotional spending.   The marketing spending data is 
supplied by a commercial gaming company that wishes to remain anonymous but is 
described in greater detail later in the chapter. 
 The second section presents hypotheses related to the investigation of whether the 
Illinois Gaming Tax rate change impacted marketing spending of commercial gaming 
companies in states that border Illinois.  The third section presents hypotheses designed 
to analyze whether gaming demand in the states surrounding Illinois was impacted by the 
increase in the gaming tax in Illinois and whether distance from the border influenced the 
magnitude of such an effect. 
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Hypotheses 
 Hypothesis 1:  It is hypothesized that the restructuring of the Illinois Gaming Tax 
in 2003 caused a negative reaction in marketing spending by a commercial gaming 
operator in the state of Illinois.  The term “2003 70% tax and overall tax restructuring” 
represents the predictor or independent variable for the gaming tax rate change. 
First Primary and Related Hypotheses 
 The null hypothesis states that there was no difference in marketing spending by 
the sponsoring company after the Illinois tax restructuring.  The null is expressed by the 
equation: 
0 :H  Coefficient of “2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring” => 0 
The research hypothesis predicts that there would be a decrease in marketing spending by 
the sponsoring company after the Illinois tax restructuring: 
1 :H  Coefficient of “2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring” < 0 
 Secondary Tests for Trend and Seasonality. 
 The following independent variables were tested to understand the general direction 
of the coin-in response variable and assess whether seasonality was a factor within the 
data set. The following hypothesis tests if there was a linear trend to the marketing 
spending data: 
0 :H   Coefficient of time “t” = 0 
1 :H   Coefficient of time “t” 0 
The following hypotheses test whether there was seasonality in the data.   Dummy 
variables representing the months February through December were added to the 
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regression model.  Only 11 months were represented by the dummy variables since the 
twelfth month is the ‘base month’, accounted for by the constant term in the equation. 
0 :H   Feb – Dec Coefficients = 0 
1 :H   Feb – Dec Coefficients  0 
Second Primary and Related Hypotheses 
 The null hypothesis states that there was no difference or a decrease in marketing 
spending or that marketing spending  by commercial gaming companies in surrounding 
states after the Illinois tax restructuring.  The null is expressed by the equation: 
0 :H  Coefficient of “2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring” <= 0 
The research hypothesis which predicts that there would be an increase in marketing 
spending by commercial gaming companies in surrounding states after the Illinois 
Gaming Tax rate restructuring reads as follows: 
1 :H  Coefficient of “2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring” > 0 
 Secondary Tests for Trend and Seasonality. 
 The same tests for trend and seasonality employed in the prior procedure were 
adopted for the investigation into marketing spending in surrounding states.  The model 
included variable(s) to model trend and monthly seasonality 
Third Primary and Related Hypotheses 
 To examine whether cross-state casinos’ distance from commercial riverboats in 
Illinois impacted demand related to the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax rate restructuring, a 
series of analyses was undertaken.  Gaming demands for each outstate (Indiana, 
Missouri, and Iowa) riverboat was analyzed individually to access each operation’s 
reaction to the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax rate.  The null hypothesis states that there was 
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no difference in gaming demand after the Illinois tax restructuring or that demand would 
decrease.  The null is expressed by the equation: 
0 :H  Coefficient of “2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring” <= 0 
The research hypothesis which predicts that there was an increase in gaming demand 
after the Illinois Gaming Tax rate restructuring reads as follows: 
1 :H  Coefficient of “2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring” > 0 
Again, the same tests for trend and seasonality employed in the prior procedure were 
adopted for the investigation into marketing spending in surrounding states. 
 Subsequently, after determining a coefficient for each riverboat in the three 
surrounding states, all coefficients served as the dependent variable in the final model.  
The null hypothesis states that distance affected no change in the surrounding states 
gaming demand in reaction to the Illinois Gaming Tax rate restructuring.  
0 :H  Coefficient of “Distance from Illinois Riverboat Casino ” = 0 
The research hypothesis which predicts that distance affected the surrounding states’ 
gaming demand after the Illinois Gaming Tax rate restructuring reads as follows: 
1 :H  Coefficient of “2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring” 0 
Data Collection 
 Secondary data for this study was compiled from a variety of sources.  For the 
purpose of the single casino marketing spending analysis, monthly data were provided by 
a sponsoring casino with a casino riverboat in the state of Illinois.  These data were 
sourced from the company’s internal records over a seven year period from January 2000, 
through December 2006.  The property competes with several other casinos in relative 
close proximity.  The particular riverboat casino which the study examines primarily 
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serves a customer that lives within convenient driving distance to the location and who is 
typically referred to as a “local”.  Typical of Illinois riverboat commercial gaming 
operations, the casino generates over 80% of its adjusted gross revenue from the wagers 
of slot players. 
 Secondary data for the research question exploring whether operators in surrounding 
states adjusted their marketing budgets were downloaded from the COMPUSTAT 
database which provided promotional allowances from 2002-2006.  Promotional 
allowances for 2000-2002 were collected directly from the companies SEC 10Q filings.  
Promotional allowances were drawn from quarterly filings.  
 In order to examine whether the gaming tax rate change in Illinois impacted gaming 
demand in surrounding states and whether distance was a factor in the magnitude of the 
potential effect, secondary data was collected from a variety of sources.  Coin-in was 
chosen as the variable to represent gaming demand. Coin-in is a gaming term describing 
the total amount of monies inserted into a slot machine.  An alternative measure 
considered was table drop, a term occasionally used by researchers to represent gaming 
volume.  The disadvantage of measuring demand or gaming volume with a table drop 
variable is that it only describes the amount a player purchases at a table and not the 
amount wagered (Kilby, Fox, & Lucas, 2004).  Although perhaps not commonplace, it is 
entirely conceivable a casino patron could purchase $1,000 in chips and put none of them 
at risk.  Coin-in by contrast represents actual monies wagered and therefore, functions as 
a more accurate representation of demand (Eisendrath, Bernhard, Lucas, & Murphy, 
2008).  Coin-in data were collected from the monthly gaming commissions of the states 
that surround Illinois (Iowa, Missouri, and Indiana).  The data were collected over a time 
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span from January 2000 to December 2006. This public data are available from the each 
states commission website and via request from the same entity.  Each riverboat docksite 
is required by their licensure to provide this information in a timely manner to the state 
office of their respective state gaming commission.  The information is made public 
shortly thereafter. 
Linear Regression Models 
 Simultaneous linear regression, where a single dependent variable or response 
variable (Y) and more than one independent or predictor variables (x) is used to fit a 
linear equation, will be employed to explore the following research questions: 
1. For the first main research question investigating a single Illinois casino’s 
marketing spending, we attempted to fit the regression model:   
  Yt = β0 + β1t + β2Feb + β3Mar + β4Apr + β5May + β6June + β7July + β8Aug +  
  β9Sept + β10Oct + β11Nov + β12Dec + β1370%tax + et 
  Yt = Marketing Spending by Sponsoring Riverboat Operator 
2. In order to analyze the second research question exploring whether operators in 
surrounding states adjusted their marketing budgets we fit the regression model: 
  Yt = β0 + β1t + β2Quarter2 + β3Quarter3 + β4Quarter4 + β570%tax + et 
  Yt = Promotional Spending by Gaming Companies in Surrounding States in      
aggregate 
3. The third research question analyzing whether the  gaming tax rate change in 
Illinois impacted gaming demand in surrounding states and whether distance was 
a factor in the magnitude of the potential effect was assessed with the following 
models: 
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a. Yt = β0 + β1t + β2Feb + β3Mar + β4Apr + β5May + β6June + β7July + β8Aug 
+ β9Sept + β10Oct + β11Nov + β12Dec + β1370%tax + et 
(continued) Yt = Surrounding State (Iowa, Missouri, Indiana) Coin-in 
b. Each riverboat operator was analyzed with a simultaneous multiple linear 
regression in an effort to generate a coefficient for each casinos reaction to 
the gaming tax increase: 
i. Yt = β0 + β1t + β2Feb + β3Mar + β4Apr + β5May + β6June + β7July 
+ β8Aug + β9Sept + β10Oct + β11Nov + β12Dec + β1370%tax + et 
Yt = Individual Outstate Operator Coin-in 
c. Distance measures were used to predict changes in the coin-in coefficient 
derived from the prior model using the following simple linear regression: 
i. Yt = β0 + β1Distance + et 
Yt = Individual outside casino reaction to gaming tax rate change 
4. Because the distance approach yielded an unsatisfactory result the approach was 
reframed.  The revised analysis focused on three separate geographic zones, all of 
which bordered Illinois. The casinos in Iowa that border Illinois were assessed as 
were the casinos in the “Chicagoland” region of Indiana and finally the analysis 
focused on the Missouri riverboats in the St. Louis region. 
a. Yt = β0 + β1t + β2Feb + β3Mar + β4Apr + β5May + β6June + β7July + β8Aug 
+ β9Sept + β10Oct + β11Nov + β12Dec + β1370%tax + et 
Yt = Indiana “Chicagoland” Operator Coin-in 
b. Yt = β0 + β1t + β2Feb + β3Mar + β4Apr + β5May + β6June + β7July + β8Aug 
+ β9Sept + β10Oct + β11Nov + β12Dec + β1370%tax + et 
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Yt = Iowa Border Operator Coin-in 
c. Yt = β0 + β1t + Individual Outstate β2Feb + β3Mar + β4Apr + β5May + 
β6June + β7July + β8Aug + β9Sept + β10Oct + β11Nov + β12Dec + 
β1370%tax + et 
Yt = Missouri (St. Louis Region) Border Operator Coin-in 
 In all prior regression models, the unknown parameters were found by minimizing the 
error of the sum of squares.  The regression equation describes the average value of y 
when the independent variables are set at (X1,X2,……..Xn). 
 A binary or dummy variable was used in multiple equation models to represent the 
70% tax level and the overall 2003 Illinois tax restructuring = {1 if period with tax hike, 
0 otherwise}.  Additionally, the “t” variable represented the trend component which as 
previously mentioned assessed whether there was long-term positive or negative 
movement in the data over time.  The months February- December were treated as 
seasonal dummy variables.  For example: Feb = {1 if period t is February, 0 otherwise}. 
 The data and the results of the models was tested for violations to the assumptions of 
linear regression modeling such as evidence of nonlinearity or heteroskedascity.  
Furthermore all models were assessed for multicollinearity via variance inflation factors 
and for autocorrelation.  A final assumption is of simultaneous multiple linear regression 
modeling is that the error terms are independent and normally distributed with mean 0 
and a common unknown variance sigma squared.   
 In time series regression modeling residuals should be tested for autocorrelation.  
Autocorrelation occurs when error terms are not random and positive terms tend to be 
followed by positive terms and negative terms tend to be followed by negative terms.   
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Without assessing diagnosing autocorrelation, the predictive value of the model is 
compromised. 
 Because of the seasonal nature of hospitality and gaming, it is often necessary to 
employ time series modeling to deal with autocorrelation.  One method of addressing 
seasonality is through the use of dummy variables as described.  The main advantage of 
including the dummy variable approach is that it results in a regression equation that 
visibly reveals the impact of statistically significant seasonal trend, and the impact of the 
predictor variable simultaneously.  Error terms were assessed graphically for 
autocorrelation by analyzing autocorrelation function chart and the partial autocorrelation 
chart if warranted.   If autocorrelation is a significant factor, then the correct procedure is 
to continue the analysis with autoregressive and/or moving-average terms in order to 
address the autocorrelation and hence the violation of the assumption that error terms are 
independent and normally distributed with mean 0 and a common unknown variance 
sigma squared. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
Introduction 
The following sections provide a detailed description of the results of the analysis of 
the data with the methodology presented in the previous chapter.  The study investigates 
three main areas of inquiry: whether the restructuring of the Illinois Gaming Tax caused 
Illinois operators to decrease marketing expenditures, whether the restructuring of the 
Illinois Gaming Tax induced operators in surrounding states to increase marketing 
expenditures in an effort to draw Illinois gaming customers to cross-state casinos, and 
finally whether the Illinois Gaming Tax resulted in an increase in gaming demand in 
surrounding states or particular geographic areas within them.  The third section can be 
viewed as an assessment of cross-state substitution.   The chapter will present the analysis 
of the three main questions separately. 
Illinois Promotional Spending 
Presented first, is the analysis of the primary hypothesis investigating whether the 
restructuring of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax caused an Illinois commercial gaming 
riverboat operator to reduce its marketing spend. Also, in the interest of providing a 
detailed account of the analysis, all phases of the investigation are included, with the 
initial step being the assessment of the promotional spending as a time series. 
Figure 5 describes the marketing expenditures of the contributing Illinois operator 
from the years 2000 to 2006.  The severe drop depicted in the graph occurs at month 43 
and represents July 2003 which is the month the Illinois Gaming Tax was altered.  The 
graph also suggests different rates of growth or trend prior to the 43 month intervention 
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as compared with the growth rate post the 43 month intervention.   This graphical 
representation supports both the inclusion of an additional trend variable and the 
intervention variable at month 43. 
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Figure 5.  Marketing spending of the riverboat operator before and after the 2003 gaming 
tax restructuring (month 43) in Illinois.  
 
Table 3 describes the average promotional expense for the contributing riverboat 
operator between January 2000 and December 2006.  Furthermore, the table includes the 
standard deviation as an indication of variance.  The data were compiled by the riverboat 
operator and supplied directly to the researchers. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Promotional Spending Model  
 N Mean SD 
Monthly Promotional 
Expense 
84 $2,361,602 $368,342 
Note.  Monthly (January 2000 – December 2006) promotional expense data provided by 
anonymous contributing Illinois riverboat operator. 
 Table 4 summarizes the multiple linear regression, investigating the effect the July 
2003 Illinois Gaming Tax change had on the promotional spending of a major Illinois 
riverboat operator.  The regression included dummy variables for the months of the year 
which are used to model seasonality, and as is standard when modeling seasonality with a 
simultaneous multiple linear regression, one month is omitted and as such serves as the 
base month.  This study arbitrarily included dummy variables for the months February 
through December and omitted the dummy variable for January.  Three trend variables:  
linear, quadratic, and cubic were utilized to model the time series, as depicted in Figure 5, 
along with an additional variable that represented the interaction between the trend and 
the tax change.  The initial results were analyzed and variables that were not significant at 
the .05 alpha level were eliminated, and the remaining variables were regressed on the 
Illinois promotional spending dependent variable.  The results of that final model are 
summarized in Table 5. 
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Table 4 
Summary of Initial Multiple Linear Regression Analysis to Estimate Effect of 2003 
Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on Promotional Spending of an Illinois Riverboat 
Operator 
Variable B SE B       P-value 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
2003 Tax Increase 
Linear Trend 
Quadratic Trend
 
Cubic Trend
 
Interaction of Trend 
and Tax Increase 
50976 
186509 
193334 
156254 
139804 
270399 
170899 
91241 
116540 
162265 
174118 
-872334 
-79785 
-10461 
107666 
574225 
102531 
102626 
102780 
102991 
103258 
103991 
103471 
103587 
103771 
104030 
104369 
99982 
79378 
30231 
38177 
140373 
0.621 
0.074 
0.064 
0.134 
0.180 
0.011* 
0.103 
0.382 
0.265 
0.124 
0.099 
0.000* 
0.318 
0.730 
0.006* 
0.000* 
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Table 5 presents the final predictor variables that were then used for the ARIMA 
model.  In addition, multicollinearity was tested by assessing the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) of each predictor variable and as such, was not deemed to be an issue.   
Table 5 
Summary of Final (Insignificant Variables Removed) Multiple Linear Regression 
Analysis to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on 
Promotional Spending of Illinois Riverboat Operator 
Variable B SE B t-value P-value VIF 
Intercept 
July 
2003 Tax 
Increase 
 
Cubic Trend
 
Interaction of 
Trend  and 
Tax Increase 
2532273 
145103 
-883407 
 
 
73716 
525562 
 
 
25086 
74686 
79432 
 
 
10742 
127917 
 
100.95 
1.94 
-11.12 
 
6.86 
4.11 
 
0.000 
0.056 
0.000 
 
 
0.000 
0.000 
 
 
1.01 
3.12 
 
1.01 
3.13 
 
 
 Subsequently, the model was assessed for autocorrelation by plotting the residuals on 
both the autocorrelation function (ACF) and the partial autocorrelation function (PACF) 
maps shown in Figure 6.  Spikes at lag one on both maps indicated that autocorrelation 
was a factor.  Autocorrelation was addressed by fitting an ARIMA (0,0,1) with 
independent variables.  The results of the ARIMA (0,0,1) are presented in Table 6. 
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Figure 6.  Initial autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of residuals from final 
regression analysis estimating the effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on 
the promotional spending of an Illinois riverboat operator. 
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Table 6 
Summary of ARIMA to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on 
Promotional Spending of Illinois Riverboat Operator 
Variable B SE B t-value P-value 
July 
2003 Tax 
Increase 
 
Cubic Trend
 
Interaction of 
Trend  and Tax 
Increase 
 
MA1 
111541.50 
-920094.00 
 
 
74043.95 
 
647490.60 
 
 
0.48 
54636.76 
94697.16 
 
13118.22 
153304.20 
 
0.08 
2.04 
-9.72 
 
5.64 
4.22 
 
6.11 
0.037 
0.000 
 
0.000 
0.000 
 
0.000 
           Note. AIC =  2265.29 
 The ARIMA estimating the effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on 
promotional spending, found four variables were significant at the .05 alpha level.  Cubic 
trend was a component of the final model as promotional spending increased by $107,666 
on a monthly basis.  In addition, July was characterized by a $270,000 increase in 
promotional spending.  The interaction between trend and the tax increase was also 
significant.   The results were again assessed for autocorrelation by assessing the 
residuals from the ARIMA plotted on both the autocorrelation function (ACF) and the 
partial autocorrelation function (PACF) maps shown in Figure 7.    The ACF and PACF 
plots confirm that the spikes, at all lags, were not significant. 
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Figure 7.  Final autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of ARIMA model 
analysis estimating the effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on 
promotional spending of Illinois riverboat operator after fitting an ARIMA model of 
(0,0,1). 
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Final Illinois Promotional Spending Results 
The omnibus F statistic was significant at the .05 alpha level, F = 59.5 with df = 4,79 and 
p < .001.  The model produced an R
2
 of .75 and an adjusted R
2
 of .74.  The null 
hypothesis of no linear relationship was rejected in this model.  Supporting the main 
hypothesis,  the restructuring of the Illinois Gaming Tax in 2003 is associated with a 
significant and negative effect on marketing spending by a commercial gaming operator 
in the state of Illinois; t = -9.72 with df = 79 and p < .001.  The change in the Illinois 
Gaming Tax in July of 2003 resulted in a $920,094 decrease in promotional spending by 
riverboat contributing the data for this study.  The moving average (MA) terms appears in 
the results of the model and was incorporated to counteract the biasing effects of serial 
correlation evident in the error terms. An ARIMA (0,0,1) with independent variables 
seemed to provide better ACF/PACF.  Next Ljung-Box tests were run on residuals from 
the ARIMA (0,0,1)  for lags 1 - 20. The smallest P-value over 20 lags was 0.11 > .05, 
hence it was concluded that the time series regression model with ARIMA (0,0,1) term 
yields residuals that are not auto-correlated. 
Cross-State Promotional Spending 
Presented in the following section is the analysis of the hypothesis investigating 
whether the restructuring of the Illinois Gaming Tax in 2003 increased the promotional 
spending of operators that were located outside of Illinois but were located primarily in 
the surrounding states. In the interest of providing a detailed account of the analysis, all 
steps of the investigation are included.  The initial step was to assess the promotional 
spending as a time series. 
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Figure 8 describes the quarterly promotional expenditures by Ameristar Casinos from 
2000 to 2007.  The graph suggests a general growth trend with a possible acceleration 
around month 15 which corresponds to the increase in the Illinois Gaming Tax.  Both the 
trend and the possible acceleration support the inclusion of both the trend variable and an 
intervention variable. 
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Figure 8. Quarterly promotional spending by Ameristar Casinos (a major riverboat 
operator without operations in Illinois) before and after the Illinois 2003 Gaming Tax 
restructuring (month 43). 
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 Table 7 describes the average promotional spending by Ameristar Casinos from the 
years 2000 – 2007 as retrieved from Compustat.  The high standard deviation suggests 
significant variance in the promotional expense during the period observed.    
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics for Promotional Spending Model 
 N Mean SD 
Monthly Promotional 
Expense 
32 $ 3,203,690 $ 1,736,475 
    
Note:   Quarterly (2000 – December 2007) Ameristar promotional spending. 
 Table 8 summarizes the multiple linear regression, investigating the effect of the July 
2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on the promotional spending by Ameristar, a 
major riverboat operator outside of Illinois.  The regression model incorporated dummy 
variables for the quarters of the year to account for seasonality.  As is standard when 
modeling seasonality with a multiple linear regression, one quarter is omitted and as 
such, serves as the base month.   This model arbitrarily included dummy variables for 
quarters 2 – 4, and omitted the quarter 1 dummy variable.   A trend variable was included 
to model the general upward direction of the time series.    
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Table 8 
Summary of Initial Multiple Linear Regression Analysis to Estimate Effect of 2003 
Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on Cross-State Promotional Spending (using 
promotional expense of Ameristar as a proxy). 
Variable B SE B P-value 
Intercept  
Quarter 2 
Quarter 3
 
Quarter 4 
2003 Tax Increase 
Trend 
256731 
-147820 
-70106 
-157377 
634684 
173472 
227222 
247241 
246680 
247601 
195938 
9542 
0.269 
0.555 
0.779 
0.531 
0.003* 
0.000* 
 
 The initial results were analyzed and all variables that were shown not to be 
significant at the .05 alpha level were excluded, and the remaining variables were again 
regressed on the Ameristar promotional spending dependent variable.  The results of that 
final model are summarized in Table 9. 
 Table 9 presents the final predictor variables that were subsequently adapted to the 
ARIMA model.  In addition, multicollinearity was tested by assessing the variance 
inflation factors (VIF) of each predictor variable.  Multicollinearity was not deemed to be 
an issue.   
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Table 9 
Summary of Final (Insignificant Variables Removed) Multiple Linear Regression 
Analysis to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on Cross-State 
Promotional Spending (using promotional expense of Ameristar as a proxy) 
Variable B SE B t-value P-value VIF 
Intercept 
2003 Tax 
Increase 
 
Trend
 
 
173888 
627470 
 
172929 
174324 
185956 
 
9055 
0.997 
3.374 
 
19.097 
0.327 
0.002 
 
0.000 
 
1.01 
 
1.01 
 
 Subsequently, the model was assessed for autocorrelation by plotting the residuals on 
both the autocorrelation function (ACF) and the partial autocorrelation function (PACF) 
maps shown in Figure 9.  Spikes at lag one on both maps indicated that autocorrelation 
was a factor.  Autocorrelation was addressed by fitting an ARIMA (0,0,1) with 
independent variables.  The results of the ARIMA (0,0,1) are presented in Table 10. 
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Figure 9.  Initial autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of residuals from final 
regression analysis to estimate effect of 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on Cross-
State promotional spending (using promotional expense of Ameristar as a proxy). 
 
 Finally, the final regression model was assessed for autocorrelation.  The residuals 
plotted on both autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function (ACF and 
PACF respectively) maps, are shown in Figure 9.  Spikes at lag one on both maps 
indicated that autocorrelation was a factor.  Autocorrelation was addressed by fitting an 
ARIMA (0,0,1)  with independent variables.  The results of the ARIMA (0,0,1) are 
presented in table 10. 
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Table 10 
Summary of ARIMA to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on 
Cross-State Promotional Spending (using promotional expense of Ameristar as a proxy) 
Variable B SE B t-value P-value 
Intercept 
2003 Tax 
Increase 
 
Trend
 
MA1 
220859 
434208 
 
173844 
 
0.55 
203711.60 
215206.30 
 
10507.57 
0.12 
 
1.08 
2.02 
 
16.54 
4.66 
0.278 
0.044 
 
0.000 
0.000 
               Note. AIC =  920.83 
 The ARIMA estimating the effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on 
cross-state promotional spending, found four variables were significant at the .05 alpha 
level.  Linear trend was a component of the final model as promotional spending 
increased by $173,844 on a monthly basis.  The results were again assessed for 
autocorrelation by assessing the residuals from the ARIMA plotted on both 
autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function maps shown in Figure 10.  
The ACF and PACF plots confirm that the spikes, at all lags, were not significant. 
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Figure 10.  Final autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of residuals from 
ARIMA model analysis to estimate effect of 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on 
Cross-State Promotional Spending (using promotional expense of Ameristar as a proxy). 
Final Cross-State Promotional Spending Results 
The omnibus F statistic was significant at the .05 alpha level, F = 196.6 with df = 
2,29 and p < .001.  The model produced an R
2
 of .93 and an adjusted R
2
 of .92.  The null 
hypothesis of no linear relationship was rejected in this model.  Supporting the main 
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hypothesis,  the restructuring of the Illinois Gaming Tax in 2003 is associated with a 
significant and positive effect on cross-state promotional spending by a commercial 
gaming company operating outside the state of Illinois; t = 2.02 with df = 29 and p < .05.  
The change in the Illinois Gaming Tax in July of 2003 resulted in a $434,208 increase in 
promotional spending by Ameristar.  The moving average (MA) terms appears in the 
results of the previous models and was incorporated to counteract the biasing effects of 
serial correlation evident in the error terms.  An ARIMA (0,0,1) with independent 
variables, seemed to provide better ACF/PACF plots.  Next Ljung-Box tests were run on 
residuals from Fit2 for lags 1 - 20. The smallest P-value over 20 lags was 0.06 > .05, 
hence it was concluded that the time series regression model with ARIMA (0,0,1) term, 
yields residuals that are not auto-correlated. 
Cross-State Substitution 
 The analysis of cross-state substitution was divided into four sections.  The first 
section assessed whether the neighboring state casinos that were close to the Illinois 
border, experienced a greater increase in gaming demand than did casinos further from 
Illinois.  The next three sections examined the impact of the gaming tax on gaming 
demand in specific geographic zones that offered commercial gaming on border of the 
state of Illinois. 
   The initial analysis assessed the impact of surrounding state casino distance from 
Illinois had on casino demand when Illinois restructured its gaming tax in 2003.  
Regressions were run on each casino in Indiana, Missouri, and Illinois by using a dummy 
variable to model the impact of the tax restructuring.  These regressions generated a 
coefficient that represented the impact of the gaming tax restructuring on the coin-in of 
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the particular surrounding state casino.  Distance measures of each casino to the Illinois 
border and to the Chicago area were then taken using Google maps and finally, these 
distances were regressed on the coefficients in order to generate a model.  Eventually, 
this approach was abandoned due to the fact that the model indicated that distance from 
both the Illinois border and from Chicago was a poor predictor for change in coin-in.   
 As such, the analysis was refocused on particular geographic zones that bordered the 
state of Illinois.  The first zone that was assessed was the “Chicagoland”  area (see figure 
11) in the northwestern corner of Indiana.  
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Indiana’s “Chicagoland” Cluster 
 
 
Figure 11.  Above image represents the locations of the riverboat casinos licensed in 
Indiana and particularly the operators in the “Chicagoland” cluster.  This section of the 
analysis focuses on boats 7-10 which are located in the northwest corner of the state as 
indicated above. 
 
 The “Chicagoland” cluster is closest to some of the higher volume Illinois riverboats 
that were affected by the highest gaming tax rates, both before and after the 2003 
restructuring.  Monthly coin-in from each of the four riverboats was aggregated and was 
plotted over the time span that began January of 2000, and continued through December 
Riverboats 7-10 are 
Indiana’s “Chicagoland” 
casinos 
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of 2006.  The time series of the “Chicagoland” cluster is plotted below in Figure 12.  
Additionally, coin-in was log transformed and a plot of the log transformed coin-in 
versus time is also provided. 
 Figure 12 describes the monthly coin-in as well as the log transformed coin-in as 
reported to the Indiana Gaming Commission by the four riverboats in Indiana’s 
“Chicagoland” area from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2006.  The graph suggests a 
general growth trend with peak occurring after month 43 which corresponds to the 
increase in the Illinois Gaming Tax.  Both the trend and the possible acceleration support 
the inclusion of both the trend variable and an intervention variable. 
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Figure 12.  Graph depicts the coin-in and log of coin-in attributed to Indiana riverboats 
operating in the “Chicagoland” area, both prior to and post the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax 
restructuring which occurred at time 43. 
 
Table 11 describes the average coin-in for the contributing riverboat operators in 
Indiana’s “Chicagoland” area between January 2000 and December 2006.  Furthermore, 
the table also includes the standard deviation as an indication of variance.  The data were 
provided by each riverboat operator via the Indiana Gaming Commission’s monthly 
reports. 
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Table 11 
Descriptive Statistics for Indiana “Chicagoland” Gaming Demand 
 N Mean SD 
Empress Horseshoe (7) 84 $ 294,180,739 $ 38,303,751 
Majestic Star  (8)           84 $ 121,560,602 $ 10,449,906 
Majestic Star II  (9) 84 $ 117,017,884 $11,820,179 
Harrahs (Resorts East) (10) 
 
84 $ 234,958,239 $ 17,820,873 
Total “Chicagoland” 84 $ 767,717,464 $ 56,987,507 
Note.  As reflected by aggregate monthly (January 2000 – December 2006) coin-in data 
from the four riverboats that populate Indiana’s “Chicagoland” market. 
 Table 12 summarizes the multiple linear regression, investigating the effect the July 
2003 Illinois Gaming Tax change had on the gaming demand at the four Indiana 
riverboats operating in the “Chicagoland” area.  The regression included dummy 
variables for the months of the year which were used to model seasonality.  As is 
standard when modeling seasonality with a multiple linear regression, one month is 
omitted and as such, serves as the base month.  This study arbitrarily included dummy 
variables for the months February through December and omitted including a dummy 
variable for January.  A trend variable was utilized in modeling the time series.  The 
initial results were analyzed and variables that were not significant at the .05 alpha level 
were eliminated and the remaining variables were again regressed on the cluster coin-in 
variable.  The results of that final model are summarized in Table 13. 
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Table 12 
Summary of Initial Multiple Linear Regression Analysis to Estimate Effect of 2003 
Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on Gaming Demand of  Indiana’s “Chicagoland” 
Casinos 
Variable B SE B P-value 
Intercept 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
2003 Tax Increase 
Trend 
20.3795 
0.0013 
0.1022 
0.0348 
0.0319 
-0.0469 
0.0263 
0.0281 
-0.0186 
-0.0200 
-0.0548 
-0.0496 
0.0559  
 0.0013 
0.0185288 
0.0239308    
0.0239337     
0.0239386 
0.0239455 
0.0239543 
0.0239904 
0.0239777 
0.0239924 
0.0240089 
0.0240275 
0.0240479 
0.0114019 
0.0002164 
0.000 
0.103 
0.000 
0.151 
0.187 
0.054 
0.277 
0.245 
0.440 
0.409 
0.026 
0.043 
0.000 
0.000          
 
 Table 13 presents the final predictor variables that were subsequently adapted to the 
ARIMA model.  In addition, multicollinearity was tested by assessing the variance 
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inflation factors (VIF) of each predictor variable.  Multicollinearity was not deemed to be 
an issue. 
Table 13 
Summary of Final (Insignificant Variables Removed) Multiple Linear Regression 
Analysis to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on Gaming 
Demand (as measured by Coin-in) at Indiana’s “Chicagoland” Casinos 
Variable B SE B t-value P-value VIF 
Intercept 
March 
June 
November 
December 
Illinois Tax 
Increase 
 
Trend 
20.39633    
 0.08687 
-0.0621 
 
-0.0698  
-0.0645 
0.05746 
 
 
0.00122     
0.0108523 
0.0188047 
0.0187972 
0.0188385 
0.0188549 
0.0118905 
 
 
0.0002253 
1879.44 
4.62 
-3.30 
-3.70 
-3.42 
4.83 
 
 
5.42 
0.000 
0.000 
0.001 
0.000 
0.001 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
1.03 
1.03 
1.04 
1.04 
1.13 
 
1.14 
 
 The final regression model was assessed for autocorrelation.  The residuals were 
plotted on both the ACF and the PACF maps shown in Figure 13.  Spikes on both maps 
indicated that autocorrelation was a factor.  Autocorrelation was best addressed by fitting 
an ARIMA (2,0,0)  with independent variables.  The results of the ARIMA (2,0,0) are 
presented in Table 14. 
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Figure 13.  Initial autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of final regression 
analysis to estimate effect of 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on Indiana 
“Chicagoland” riverboat demand. 
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Table 14 
Summary of ARIMA to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on 
Gaming Demand (as measured by log transformed Coin-in) at Indiana’s “Chicagoland” 
Casinos that Border Illinois 
Variable B SE B t-value P-value 
Intercept 
March 
June 
November 
December 
2003 Tax 
Increase 
 
Trend 
AR1 
AR2 
 
19.51 
 0.08 
-0.08 
-0.05 
-0.06 
 
0.06 
0.001 
0.30 
0.28 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
 
0.01 
0.0004 
0.10 
0.02 
 
1019.67 
5.54 
-5.40 
-3.60 
-3.94 
 
2.94 
3.25 
2.78 
2.80 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
 
0.003 
0.001 
0.005 
0.005 
           Note. AIC =  -285.06 
 
 The ARIMA estimating the effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on 
Indiana’s “Chicagoland” gaming demand determined that six variables were significant at 
the .05 alpha level.  Trend was a component of the final model as gaming demand 
increased by a six percent on a monthly basis.  In addition, March was characterized by 
an eight percent increase in coin-in.  Coin-in fell in June, November and December by 
between five and eight percent.  The impact from the tax restructuring is discussed in the 
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next section.  The results were again assessed for autocorrelation by assessing the 
residuals from the ARIMA plotted on both autocorrelation function and partial 
autocorrelation function maps shown in Figure 9.  The ACF and PACF plots confirm that 
the spikes, at all lags, were not significant. 
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Figure 14.  Initial autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of residuals from the 
ARIMA (2,0,0) analysis to estimate effect of 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on 
Indiana “Chicagoland” riverboat demand. 
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Final Indiana “Chicagoland” Cross-State Gaming Demand Results 
 The omnibus F statistic was significant at the .05 alpha level, F = 22.5 with df = 6,77 
and p < .001.  The model produced an R
2
 of .64 and an adjusted R
2
 of .61.  The null 
hypothesis of no linear relationship was rejected in this model.  Supporting the main 
hypothesis,  the restructuring of the Illinois Gaming Tax in 2003 is associated with a 
significant and positive effect on gaming demand as measured by coin-in, in the Indiana 
“Chicagoland” cluster of riverboat operators, t = 2.94 with df = 77 and p < .005.  The 
change in the Illinois Gaming Tax in July of 2003 resulted in a 6 percent increase in 
Indiana “Chicagoland” gaming demand.  The autoregressive (AR) terms appearing of the 
previous models was incorporated to counteract the biasing effects of serial correlation 
evident in the error terms.  An ARIMA (2,0,0) with independent variables seemed to 
provide better ACF/PACF plots.  Next Ljung-Box tests were run on the residuals from 
Fit1 for lags 1 - 20. The smallest P-value over 20 lags was 0.15 > .05, hence it was 
concluded that the time series regression model with ARIMA (2,0,0) term yields 
residuals that are not auto-correlated. 
The Iowa Cluster 
 The second zone that was assessed was the Iowa cluster of riverboats that all border 
the state of Illinois on its western border (see figure 15) 
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Figure 15.  Above image represents the locations of the riverboat casinos licensed in 
Iowa and particularly the operators that border the state of Illinois.  This section of the 
analysis focuses on boats 4-6, 8 and 9 which are located in the eastern border of Iowa as 
indicated above. 
 
 The Iowa cluster is comprised of five riverboats that are operated on the border of 
Iowa and Illinois.  While this area is not typified by the gaming demand that is evident in 
the Chicago region of Illinois, the Illinois operators competing with the Iowa riverboats 
were still affected by changes related to the 2003 restructuring.  Monthly coin-in from the 
five riverboats was aggregated and was plotted over the time span that began January of 
2000 and continued through December of 2006.  The time series of the Iowa cluster is 
The Iowa Cluster 
4. Diamond Jo Casino (Dubuque) 
5. Catfish Bend Casino (Fort    
 Madison/Burlington) 
6. Mississippi Belle II (Clinton) 
8. Rhythm City Casino (Davenport) 
9.  Isle of Capri-Bettendorf  
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plotted in Figure 16.  Additionally, coin-in was log transformed and a plot of the log 
transformed coin-in versus time is also provided. 
 Figure 16 describes the monthly coin-in as well as the log transformed coin-in as 
reported to the Iowa Gaming Commission by the five riverboats in Indiana’s 
“Chicagoland” area from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2006.  The graph suggests a 
general growth trend with a peak occurring after month 43 which corresponds to the 
increase in the Illinois Gaming Tax and then a gradual decline.  Both the trend and the 
possible acceleration support the inclusion of both the two trend variables and an 
intervention variable. 
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Figure 16.  Iowa Cluster riverboat operator demand as measured by coin-in (y) and by 
log transformed coin-in (yl) before and after the 2003 gaming tax restructuring in Illinois 
(which occurred at time 43).  
 
 Table 15 describes the average coin-in for the Iowa riverboat operators, all bordering 
Illinois, between January 2000 and December 2006.  Furthermore, the table also includes 
the standard deviation as an indication of variance.  The data were provided by each 
riverboat operator via the Iowa Gaming Commission’s monthly reports. 
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Table 15 
Descriptive Statistics for Iowa Riverboat Border Cluster Gaming Demand 
 N Mean SD 
DiamondJo 84 $ 53,340,432 $ 5,393,260 
MSBII 84 $ 29,761,200 $ 2,686,671 
Catfish Bend 84 $ 29,001,704 $ 2,208,480 
Isle of Capri 84 $ 107,888,420 $ 11,077,743 
Rhythm City 84 $ 76,954,508 $ 9,885,175 
Total Iowa 
Riverboat Cluster 
84 $ 296,946,246 $ 23,757,825 
Note.  As reflected by aggregate monthly (January 2000 – December 2006) coin-in data 
from the four riverboats that operate in Iowa and are located on the Iowa/Illinois border. 
 Table 16 summarizes the multiple linear regression investigating the effect the July 
2003 Illinois Gaming Tax change had on the gaming demand at the five Iowa riverboats 
operating in the area bordering the western perimeter of Illinois.  The regression included 
dummy variables for the months of the year which were used to model seasonality.  As is 
standard when modeling seasonality with a simultaneous linear regression, one month is 
omitted and as such serves as the base month.  This study arbitrarily included dummy 
variables for the months February through December and omitted including a dummy 
variable for January.  After analyzing the results and reassessing the times series, a 
second trend variable was added to the time series model in order to achieve a better fit of 
a parabolic trend.  Both the original trend variable and the squared trend variable were 
standardized in order to mitigate the multicollinearity that often occurs with the inclusion 
of multiple trend variables.  The initial results were analyzed and variables that were not 
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significant at the .05 alpha level were eliminated and the remaining variables were again 
regressed on the cluster coin-in variable.  The results of that final model are summarized 
in Table 17. 
Table 16 
Summary of Initial Multiple Linear Regression Analysis to Estimate Effect of 2003 
Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on Gaming Demand of Iowa Casinos that Border 
Illinois 
Variable B SE B P-value 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
2003 Tax Increase 
Trend 
8736987 
34742665 
16606201 
21802098 
11971871 
34755487 
31287039 
14610905 
18702231 
4414361 
-3353306 
30599425 
-239927 
8590952 
8590952 
8592707 
8595164 
8598323 
8611283 
8606739 
8611995 
8617949 
8624597 
8631940 
4092692 
77676 
0.313 
0.000 
0.057 
0.013 
0.168 
0.000 
0.001 
0.094 
0.033 
0.610 
0.699 
0.000 
0.003 
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 Table 17 presents the final predictor variables that were subsequently adapted to the 
ARIMA model.  In addition, multicollinearity was tested by assessing the variance 
inflation factors (VIF) of each predictor variable.  Multicollinearity was not deemed to be 
an issue.   
Table 17 
Summary of Final (Insignificant Variables Removed) Multiple Linear Regression 
Analysis to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on Gaming 
Demand (as measured by log transformed Coin-in) at Iowa Casinos that Border Illinois 
Variable B SE B t-value P-value VIF 
Intercept 
March 
May 
July 
August 
2003 Tax 
Increase 
 
Linear Trend 
Quadratic Trend 
19.51 
0.09 
0.04 
0.09 
0.07 
0.06 
 
-0.01 
-0.04 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.01 
 
0.01 
0.01 
1710.26 
4.58 
2.25 
4.72 
3.83 
4.21 
 
-2.45 
-6.24 
0.000 
0.000 
0.027 
0.019 
0.019 
0.000 
 
0.017 
0.000 
 
1.03 
1.03 
1.04 
1.03 
1.52 
 
1.17 
1.33 
 
The final regression model was assessed for autocorrelation.  The residuals plotted on 
both autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function (ACF and PACF 
respectively) maps are shown in Figure 17.  Spikes on both the ACF and PACF map 
indicated that autocorrelation was a factor and was best addressed by fitting an ARIMA 
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(1,0,0)  with independent variables.  The results of the ARIMA (1,0,0) are presented in 
Table 18. 
 
Figure 17.  Initial autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of final regression 
analysis to estimate effect of 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on the Iowa cluster 
riverboat demand. 
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Table 18 
Summary of ARIMA to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on 
Gaming Demand (as measured by log transformed Coin-in) at Iowa Casinos that Border 
Illinois 
Variable B SE B t-value P-value 
Intercept 
March 
May 
July 
August 
2003 Tax 
Increase 
 
Linear Trend 
Quadratic Trend 
AR1 
19.51 
0.08 
0.03 
0.08 
0.06 
0.05 
 
-0.01 
-0.04 
0.40 
0.01 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
 
0.01 
0.01 
0.10 
1258.85 
4.58 
2.25 
4.72 
3.83 
4.21 
 
-2.45 
-6.24 
3.83 
0.000 
0.000 
0.057 
0.000 
0.000 
0.004 
 
0.078 
0.000 
0.000 
           Note. AIC =  -273.64. 
The ARIMA estimating the effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring 
on Iowa cluster gaming demand determined that seven variables were significant at the 
.05 alpha level.  Quadratic trend was a component of the final model as gaming demand 
decreased by four percent on a monthly basis.  In addition, March, May, July and August 
were characterized by between a three and eight percent increase in coin-in.    The impact 
from the tax restructuring is discussed in the next section.  The results were again 
assessed for autocorrelation by assessing the residuals from the ARIMA plotted on both 
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autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation function maps shown in Figure 18.  
The ACF and PACF plots confirm that the spikes, at all lags, were not significant. 
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Figure 18.  Final autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of residuals from the 
ARIMA (1,0,0) analysis to estimate effect of 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on 
the Iowa cluster riverboat demand. 
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Final Iowa Cross-State Gaming Demand Results 
 The omnibus F statistic was significant at the .05 alpha level, F = 23.7, df = 7,76 and 
p < .001.  The model produced an R
2
 of .68 and an adjusted R
2
 of .66.  The null 
hypothesis of no linear relationship was rejected in this model.  Supporting the main 
hypothesisa,  the restructuring of the Illinois Gaming Tax in 2003 is associated with a 
significant and positive effect on demand or coin-in of Iowa riverboats operating on the 
border area of the state of Illinois, t = 4.21 with df = 76 and p < .01.  The change in the 
Illinois Gaming Tax in July of 2003 resulted in an 5% increase in gaming demand at the 
five Iowa riverboats  operating on the Iowa/Illinois border.  The autoregressive (AR) term 
appears in the results of the model and was incorporated to counteract the biasing effects 
of serial correlation evident in the error terms. An ARIMA(1,0,0) with independent 
variables seemed to provide better ACF/PACF.  Next, Ljung-Box tests were run on 
residuals from Fit2 for lags 1 - 20. The smallest P-values over 20 lags was 0.11 > .05, 
hence it was concluded that the time series regression model with ARIMA(1,0,0) term 
yields residuals that are not auto-correlated. 
The Missouri Cluster 
 The third zone that was assessed was the Missouri cluster of riverboats that all border 
the state of Illinois on its southwestern border (see figure 19) 
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Figure 19.  Above image represents the locations of the riverboat casinos licensed in the 
St. Louis cluster of Missouri.  This section of the analysis focuses on boats 2, 5, &10 
which are located in the east central portion of the Missouri which borders Illinois as 
indicated above. 
 
 The Missouri cluster surrounds St. Louis, and is served by riverboats located in 
Illinois and Missouri.  The Illinois boats were of course directly affected by the 2003 
gaming tax restructuring.  Monthly coin-in from the three riverboats was aggregated and 
was plotted over the time span that began from January of 2000 and continued through 
December of 2006.  The time series of the Missouri cluster is plotted below in figure 20.  
Additionally, coin-in was log transformed and a plot of the log transformed coin-in 
versus time and the square root of time are also provided. 
Missouri Cluster 
2. Ameristar (St. Charles) 
5. Harrah’s (Maryland Heights) 
10. President Casino on the  
 Admiral 
St Louis 
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 Figure 20 describes the monthly coin-in as well as the log transformed coin-in as 
reported to the Missouri Gaming Commission by the three riverboats both on Missouri’s 
Illinois border and located in the St. Louis area from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 
2006.  The graph suggests a general growth trend.   
 
Figure 20.  Missouri Cluster riverboat operator demand as measured by log Missouri 
coin-in (y) with time (t) and the square root of time sqrt(t) before and after the 2003 
gaming tax restructuring in Illinois (which occurred at time 43 on the upper graph and 
after 6 on the bottom graph).  
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 Table 19 describes the average coin-in for the contributing riverboat operators in 
Missouri between January 2000 and December 2006.  Furthermore, the table includes the 
standard deviation as an indication of variance.  The data were provided by each 
riverboat operator via the Missouri Gaming Commission’s monthly reports. 
Table 19 
Descriptive Statistics for Missouri Riverboat Border Cluster Gaming Demand 
 N Mean SD 
Ameristar 84 $ 233,877,871 $ 63,938,901 
President 84 $ 76,037,552 $ 9,592,105 
Harrah’s MH 84 $ 270,796,553 $ 29,730,039 
Total Missouri 
Riverboat Cluster 
84 $ 580,711,977 $ 68,649,707 
Note.  As reflected by aggregate monthly (January 2000 – December 2006) coin-in data 
from the four riverboats that operate in Missouri and are located on the Missouri/Illinois 
border. 
Table 20 summarizes the multiple linear regression primarily investigating the effect 
the July 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax change had on the gaming demand for the three 
Missouri riverboats operating the border of Illinois and in the St. Louis area.  The 
regression included dummy variables for the months of the year which are used to model 
seasonality.  As is standard when modeling seasonality with a multiple linear regression, 
one month is omitted and as such serves as the base month.  This study arbitrarily 
included dummy variables for the months February through December and omitted 
including a dummy variable for January.  A trend variable was included to model the 
time series.  The initial results were analyzed and variables that were not significant at the 
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.05 alpha level were eliminated and the remaining variables were again regressed on the 
cluster coin-in variable.  The results of that final model are summarized in Table 21. 
Table 20 
Summary of Initial Multiple Linear Regression Analysis to Estimate Effect of 2003 
Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on Gaming Demand of a Missouri Casinos (as 
measured by log transformed Coin-in) that Border Illinois 
Variable B SE B P-value 
Intercept 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
October 
November 
December 
2003 Tax Increase 
Trend 
19.8333 
-0.0077 
0.0720 
0.0389 
0.0537 
0.0109 
0.0636 
0.0522 
0.0092 
0.0013 
-0.0047 
-0.0005 
0.0431 
0.0490 
0.0292821 
0.032715 
0.0327231 
0.032735 
0.0327502 
0.0327684 
0.0328079 
0.0328125 
0.0328381 
0.0328659 
0.0328956 
0.0329273 
0.0158776 
0.003443 
0.000 
0.815 
0.031 
0.239 
0.106 
0.741 
0.057 
0.116 
0.781 
0.970 
0.886 
0.987 
0.008 
0.000 
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Table 21 presents the final predictor variables that were subsequently adapted to the 
ARIMA model.  In addition, multicollinearity was tested by assessing the variance 
inflation factors (VIF) of each predictor variable.  Multicollinearity was, as such, not 
deemed to be an issue.   
Table 21 
Summary of Final (Insignificant Variables Removed) Multiple Linear Regression 
Analysis to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on Gaming 
Demand (as measured by log transformed Coin-in) at Missouri Casinos that Border 
Illinois 
Variable B SE B t-value P-value VIF 
Intercept 
March 
2003 Tax 
Increase 
 
Trend (sqrt)
 
19.85 
0.05 
0.05 
 
0.05 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
 
0.00 
929.52 
2.11 
2.87 
 
14.03 
0.000 
0.035 
0.004 
 
 
0.000 
 
1.00 
1.68 
 
1.17 
 
 The final regression model was assessed for autocorrelation.  The residuals plotted on 
both ACF and PACF maps are shown in Figure 21.  Spikes on both maps indicated that 
autocorrelation was a factor.  Autocorrelation was best addressed by fitting an ARIMA 
(2,0,0) with independent variables.  The results of the ARIMA (2,0,0) are presented in 
Table 22.   
99 
 
 
Figure 21.  Initial autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of final regression 
analysis to estimate the effect of 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on Missouri 
cluster riverboat demand. 
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Table 22 
Summary of ARIMA to Estimate Effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax Restructuring on 
Gaming Demand (as measured by log transformed Coin-in) at Missouri Casinos that 
Border Illinois, “The Missouri Cluster” 
Variable B SE B t-value P-value 
Intercept 
MA1 
MA2 
March  
2003 Tax 
Increase 
 
Trend (sqt) 
19.85 
0.40 
0.50 
0.04 
0.06 
 
0.05 
0.03 
0.09 
0.16 
0.02 
0.02 
 
0.01 
616.39 
4.55 
3.14 
2.04 
2.42 
 
9.44 
0.000 
0.000 
0.002 
0.041 
0.015 
 
0.000 
           Note. AIC =  -244.45. 
 The ARIMA estimating the effect of the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on 
Missouri cluster gaming demand determined that three variables were significant at the 
.05 alpha level.  Trend was a component of the final model as gaming demand increased 
by five percent on a monthly basis.  In addition, March was characterized by a four 
percent increase in coin-in.  The impact from the tax restructuring is discussed in the next 
section.  The results were again assessed for autocorrelation by assessing the residuals 
from the ARIMA plotted on both autocorrelation function and partial autocorrelation 
function maps shown in Figure 22.  The ACF and PACF plots confirm that the spikes, at 
all lags, were not significant.  
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Figure 22.  Final autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of residuals from the 
ARIMA (0,0,2) analysis to estimate effect of 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on 
the Missouri cluster riverboat demand. 
 
Final Missouri Cross-State Gaming Demand Results 
 The omnibus F statistic was significant at the .05 alpha level, F = 112.2 with df = 
3,80 and p < .001.  The model produced an R
2
 of .81 and an adjusted R
2
 of .80.  The null 
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hypothesis of no linear relationship was rejected in this model.  Supporting the main 
hypothesisa,  the restructuring of the Illinois Gaming Tax in 2003 is associated with a 
significant and positive effect on demand or coin-in of Missouri riverboats operating on 
the border area of the state of Illinois, t = 2.42 with df = 80 and p < .05.  The change in 
the Illinois Gaming Tax in July of 2003 resulted in a six percent increase in coin-in at the 
four Missouri riverboats located on the border of Illinois and in the St. Louis area.  The 
moving average (MA) term appears in the results of the model and was incorporated to 
counteract the biasing effects of serial correlation evident in the error terms. An ARIMA 
(0,0,2) with independent variables seemed to provide better ACF/PACF plots.  Next, 
Ljung-Box tests were run on the residuals from Fit2 for lags 1 - 20. The smallest P-value 
over 20 lags was 0.61 > .05, hence it was concluded that the time series regression model 
with ARIMA (0,0,2) term yields residuals that are not auto-correlated. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
 This chapter will present the conclusions that can be deduced from the results of the 
study and furthermore, it will address the implications of those conclusions.  Lastly, 
limitations inherent in the research, along with recommendations for future research will 
also be discussed.  The primary purpose of this research is to provide a better 
understanding of the repercussions related to the 2003 gaming restructuring in the state of 
Illinois.   The research questions are concerned with both operator reactions in and 
outside of Illinois as well as changes to customer demand in response to the restructuring 
of the aforementioned Illinois Gaming Tax. 
 The study accesses whether a particular operator in Illinois and a gaming company 
whose riverboats are primarily located in the area around Illinois made changes to their 
promotional expenditures in response to the 2003 Illinois tax increase and restructuring.  
In addition, and as an extension of earlier research into the impact of the 2003 gaming 
taxes impact on Illinois riverboat demand, this research assesses the taxes policy’s impact 
on surrounding state gaming demand.  In other words, did the increase in the Illinois 
Gaming Tax result in cross-state substitution?  Based on an exhaustive review of the 
literature, time-series regression modeling was selected for the analyses. 
Findings 
 The three primary research questions all generated significant results.  The first 
section of the analysis investigated the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax restructuring on the 
promotional spending of an Illinois riverboat operator.  The final model explained 75% of 
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the variance in the dependent variables and found that the gaming tax increase resulted in 
a $920,094 decrease in monthly promotional spending by the riverboat that contributed 
data to this study.  The model also suggested that seasonality was a factor in predicting 
promotional spending by the riverboat with the month of July bringing an $111,541 
increase in the operator’s promotional expenditures.  Finally, the model indicated the 
presence of a positive trend as well as an interaction between the overall trend and the tax 
restructuring. 
 The second focus of the research was whether the 2003 Gaming Tax restructuring in 
Illinois caused operators in surrounding states to inflate their promotional spending in 
what may have be an attempt to capture vulnerable business volume from the Illinois 
market.  The quarterly promotional spending by Ameristar Casinos was chosen as the 
best available representation of a casino company with a focus on the geographical area 
surrounding Illinois.  The final model explained 93% of the variance in the dependent 
variables and found that the gaming tax increase resulted in a $434,208 increase in 
quarterly promotional spending by the Ameristar Casinos.  The model also revealed that 
seasonality was not a significant influence but there was an overall positive quarterly 
trend of $173,844 in promotional spending by the company. 
 The third and final component of the study examined whether the implementation of 
the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax increase and restructuring impacted gaming demand in 
areas that competed with Illinois for gaming revenues.  Coin-in was adopted as a proxy 
for demand and three geographic areas in three distinct states that all border Illinois were 
analyzed. 
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 The “Chicagoland” region located in the northeast corner of Indiana and host to four 
riverboats operated by three distinct gaming companies was the first geographic zone 
assessed.   The final model explained 64% of the variance in the dependent variables and 
found that the gaming tax increase resulted in a six percent increase in monthly Indiana 
“Chicagoland” gaming demand.  The model also suggested that seasonality was a factor 
in predicting “Chicagoland” gaming demand.  The months of June, November, and 
December all had a negative impact on gaming demand or between five and eight 
percent, while March contributed to a positive eight percent increase in coin-in.  Lastly, 
the final model suggested the existence of a very slight overall upward trend in gaming 
demand of approximately a tenth of one percent. 
 In addition to Indiana’s “Chicagoland” region, the analysis focused on gaming 
demand at the five Iowa riverboats that operate on the Iowa/Illinois border.  This region 
produced a model that explained 68% of the variance in the dependent variables and 
revealed that the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax increase and restructuring resulted in a 5 
percent increase in monthly gaming demand at the five Iowa riverboats examined.  
Seasonality was again a component of the final model with the months of March, May, 
July, and August all contributing to a positive increase in coin-in of between three and 
eight percent.  Finally, the Iowa model indicated the presence of a negative overall trend 
that began as a one percent negative trend and accelerated to negative four percent. 
 The third and final cluster of casinos examined was the three riverboats located in the 
St. Louis area on its western border with Illinois.   The final model explained 81% of the 
variance in the dependent variables and found that the Illinois Gaming Tax increase 
resulted in a six percent increase in monthly gaming demand at the three Missouri 
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riverboats operating in the St. Louis area.  Furthermore, the model indicated that 
seasonality was again a component in predicting Missouri coin-in and that the month of 
March contributed to a four percent increase in gaming demand.  Trend was also shown 
to be significant with a positive monthly five percent impact on gaming demand. 
Discussion of Findings 
 The findings were largely supportive of the theories referenced in the literature 
section, with the possible exception of Pygovian tax theory.   Since no attempt was made, 
to the knowledge of this research, by Illinois to quantify either the negative consequences 
related to commercial gaming or to quantify the advantage enjoyed by operators in a 
limited gaming license environment, one cannot claim that the Illinois gaming tax is 
characterizable as Pygovian. 
 The findings are generally supportive of models based on equity theory both with 
regard to the reaction of consumers and gaming managers.  The findings suggest that 
gaming customers facing decreased promotional perks in Illinois, traveled across the 
borders of the state to Iowa, Indiana, and Missouri and spent their gaming dollars there.  
Casino managers were also impacted by what might be characterized as in inequitable tax 
structure in Illinois decreased marketing spending in the state in order to slow revenues.  
The findings also indicated that gaming operators in surrounding states are apt to attempt 
to benefit by increasing their promotional budgets in an attempt to further encourage 
disgruntled gaming customers to cross into their states and visit their casinos. 
 Furthermore, the findings are supportive of prospect theory.  Prospect  theory predicts 
that individuals are likely to overweight outcomes that are certain, such as having to pay 
for parking or admission, compared to outcomes that are merely probable, such as losing 
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to a casino.  This explains the customer reaction to the withholding of complimentaries 
such as free parking and free admission by Illinois gaming operators in reaction to the tax 
increase.  The customers are likely aware of a statistical advantage related to slots and 
table games that favor the operator, yet the withdrawal of certain outcomes such as a free 
buffet resulted in cross-state substitution. 
Implications of Findings 
 The findings of this dissertation present implications for government policy makers, 
industry stakeholders, and academics.  Academically, this research extends previous 
hospitality literature that suggests customers are sensitive to changes in price and 
furthermore supports research related to customer disappointment when expectations are 
no longer met.  In the case of the Illinois riverboats, policy changes related to 
complimentary promotions were altered when the state increased its tax demands on 
operators.  Customers who were accustomed to the being provided with a level of comp 
related benefits, that for example, may have provided free buffets or free parking, were 
downgraded and received less.  The increase in gaming demand in the geographic 
clusters of operators surrounding Illinois, suggests that customers took their wallet across 
state lines and contributed to the gross gaming revenues and resulting gaming tax receipts 
in Iowa, Missouri, and Indiana.   
 The latter effect provides cause for concern for state governments contemplating 
changes to their gaming tax rates.  This research suggests that operators will react at least 
in part by decreasing their promotional budgets.  Government policy makers interested in 
maximizing gaming tax receipts may want to further investigate the longer term 
repercussions related to increases in gaming taxes.  Although this research does not 
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formally investigate the rate of recovery from a drop in gaming demand in correlation to 
an increase in the state gaming tax (primarily because the Illinois tax increase was 
readjusted to earlier levels the following year).  The data does suggest that the most 
drastic reaction in customer demand happened almost immediately after the policy took 
effect and that demand appeared to be trending upwards even prior to the lowering of the 
tax rate the following year.   
Limitations 
 The findings of this study must be considered with respect to its limitations.  The first 
section of the analysis relies on the promotional spending data supplied by as single 
Illinois riverboat operator.  This is in part a reflection of the inherent difficulty of 
obtaining data from commercial gaming operators, who are typically extremely reluctant 
to share data outside of their company.  Although operators are required to share 
revenues with state regulators and though public companies must share certain aggregate 
financial data with the Securities and Exchange Commission, monthly promotional data 
from a particular operator is only available directly from the source.   
 Similarly, obtaining data to model promotional spending by gaming companies that 
compete with Illinois gaming operators is subject to the same obstacles.  Although 
companies like Harrahs (now Caesars) operate multiple boats in markets that compete 
with this study’s Illinois operator, they do not break down their results or promotional 
spending on a boat by boat or a state by state basis at least not for public inspection.  
Since the only promotional spending data from Harrahs was aggregate quarterly figures 
that reflected their major operations in Las Vegas and New Jersey, including their figures 
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with the Ameristar data whose business was primarily centered in the Midwestern market 
was deemed imprudent. 
 A further limitation to this data is the use of coin-in as a proxy for gaming demand.  
Coin-in, while generally considered the best representative of gaming demand, does not 
constitute the entire revenue equation as it ignores the impact of table game play.   
However, the inclusion of table game drop is fraught with its own limitations.  Since 
coin-in (slots) represents the source of the vast majority of revenues as well as profits for 
the Midwestern riverboat market, the decision to focus on the metric in light of the 
inherent limitations was made. 
Future Research  
 The replication of the promotional component of this study with additional 
contributing operators would lead to a better assessment as to the degree to which these 
results are generalizable.  Cooperation from an operator that operated riverboats in 
Illinois and one or more of the surrounding states during the period analyzed would be 
ideal.  This would enable the researcher to empirically demonstrate that companies shift 
promotional allowances from less lucrative markets to more lucrative markets.  It should 
be noted that this study attempted to obtain such data but the researcher was denied and 
informed that Illinois regulators and government leaders cautioned operators against 
attempting to drive customers cross-state to Indiana.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
this cross-state shift in promotional spending is precisely what occurred, but perhaps 
understandably, operators to not wish to empirically substantiate their actions for fear of 
future retribution from governing authorities. 
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 With the general proliferation of commercial gaming in both the United States and 
internationally, the opportunity to further explore changes in gaming taxation and its 
effects both on internal and external demand is increasing.  Extending this research into 
the Asian market will require adjusting the proxy for demand since the Asian market is 
largely reliant on table games for revenues and profits much unlike the Midwestern 
riverboat market. 
Summary 
 The examination of the relationship between the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax increase 
and operator promotional spending revealed that casino operators will react to increases 
in gaming taxes by reducing spending in other areas.  Since the gaming tax rate in Illinois 
is incrementally higher as gaming revenue grows, operators are motivated to limit 
promotional expenditures that will elevate them into a higher tax rate in the effort to 
maximize shareholder value.   
 In contrast, operators in surrounding states, who are subject to lower gaming tax rates, 
appear to increase promotional spending in order to capture gaming revenues from 
operators in competing states with less competitive tax structures.  Earlier research 
indicated that the 2003 Illinois Gaming Tax increase and restructuring had a punitive 
effect on gaming demand within the state of Illinois (Ahlgren, Dalbor, and Singh. 2009) 
but failed to provide and explanation of the reaction.  That is, gaming customers do not 
directly experience the changes to a state’s gaming tax structure.  The tax is not, for 
instance, directly confiscated from their winnings.  As such, the earlier research was 
lacking in an explanation for the change in customer behavior.  By demonstrating that 
operators scale back promotional spending which in turn directly impacts the customer 
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experience, a link between the tax increase and the change in gaming demand is 
established. 
 The results suggest that the implications of a state’s gaming tax rate increases extend 
beyond the state’s borders was further substantiated by the assessment of gaming demand 
in three geographical zones which compete with Illinois for gaming revenues.  The 
increase in gaming demand in all three states that border Illinois is largely a reflection of 
the competitive nature of the Midwestern riverboat market.  The majority in the 
commercial gaming markets have participated in the general easing of gaming 
regulations to better position themselves yet appear to be less wary of the impacts of 
changes in their gaming tax rates.   
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